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ABSTRACT 
 
The contribution of this dissertation is to show that colonial state building efforts 
were more successful in the long term when the state invested in education for the 
colonized population. This argument builds upon recent literature showing that state co-
optation of indigenous populations can facilitate state building, but I go further in arguing 
that colonial policy was not only cooptation, but in some contexts inclusive, leading the 
population to be vested in and participants in the state. I develop an argument for the 
influence of the causal mechanism, colonial inclusivity, on contemporary state capacity in 
post-colonial states. Through a qualitative and quantitative investigation of this 
mechanism, I find that the investment in and the colonized population’s access to quality 
education during the colonial period reaps positive gains for contemporary state capacity.  
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Chapter I: INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation contributes to a growing literature examining how colonialism 
has structured the modern world. I specifically examine how colonialism influenced state 
building and contemporary state capacity. My primary contribution is to extend recent 
and interesting developments in the colonial literature, which note that outcomes in the 
periphery arise from the interaction of metropole policies and domestic social structures, 
and are not merely dictated by colonial powers. Prominent examples of these approaches 
are Frankema (2013), Lange (2009), Mahoney (2010), Matsuzaki (2019), and Owolabi 
(2015). These scholars examine how metropole colonial strategies, such as direct and 
indirect rule, or the extent of co-opting local elites, influenced the success of the colonial 
state building project. 
My dissertation notes that the interaction between metropole policies and 
domestic structures goes even deeper. Whereas the current literature continues to view 
these interactions as a form of state control, leading to domestic compliance, I argue that 
the colonial state-society relationship also includes an element of inclusion, in which 
local populations are incorporated into the state building project through education and 
socialization, rather than just cooptation and coercion. Moreover, whereas cooptation 
helped gain compliance with the colonial state, the increase in educational access and 
inclusion in the state helped induce endearment1 to the colonial state. 
Therefore, this dissertation is a story of the transformative power of education for 
the human capital of a population, and more specifically how that transformation fuels 
                                                             
1 What I mean here is that natives could see their own personal interests come into alignment with the 
colonial state, and want to perpetuate a model in which their interests are best served.  
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political outcomes. The importance of education for politics has been theorized by 
modernization scholars since Lipset (1959). This dissertation investigates an overlooked 
yet historically important slice of the education and politics nexus, which is how much 
and in what manner imperial states implemented education policies in the colonies circa 
1850-1950. I evaluate theoretically and empirically the effect of colonial education policy 
(henceforth colonial inclusivity) on contemporary state capacity. The latter phrase has 
many meanings, but despite huge variations in how the concept has been measured, most 
policy practitioners and social scientists do argue that some states have a higher capacity 
to get things done, while others states simply do not have this capacity. Although this 
relationship between education and politics is certainly not unique to colonialism, 
understanding the colonial context is important because the colonial enterprise was 
disruptive of pre-colonial trajectories of human history and, as argued below, continues to 
shape contemporary politics.  
Indonesian colonial history, and in particular the expansion of education during 
the colonial period, nicely illustrates the central assertion of this dissertation, which is 
that imperial states can and do intentionally create human capital in indigenous 
populations in an attempt to build states. From the early part of the 19th century until 
sovereignty was officially granted in 1949, the Dutch strategy in the Netherlands East 
Indies2 underwent rapid transformation. Most notably, with the transition of control over 
the archipelago from the Dutch East Indies Company to the Dutch government, this 
period is marked by intentional shifts in policy related to the provision of education for 
the native population. Their education policy in the East Indies received a boost by 
                                                             
2 Often used interchangeably with “Dutch East Indies”. 
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increasing the expenditures for education and evolving from using education to maintain 
a strong agricultural indigenous workforce, to using it as a means of building a cadre of 
skilled laborers that could help manage the state apparatus. The Dutch Parliament was 
motivated to shift their approach in the Netherlands East Indies on one hand as an output 
of rising classical liberalism3 in Parliament in the 19th century, and on the other hand as a 
function of their desire to expand to outer islands rich in resources. As a result, in the 
middle of the 19th century, the percentage of the total population that was enrolled in 
school at all levels was abysmal4 compared to the rest of the world (15,000), whereas that 
number ballooned into the millions by their official independence in 1949.  
This evolution in the Dutch colonial policy on education that granted the 
indigenous population greater access to the educational opportunities necessary for social 
mobility resulted in the creation of a native corps of bureaucrats (Pangreh Praja), which 
remained a bureaucracy after independence. First, the use of education as a state building 
effort would have ramifications for the structure of the bureaucracy after independence, 
even when accounting for the brief, but meaningful, disruption of the Japanese 
occupation (1942-1945). Second, even though education bounced back after the Japanese 
occupation and the bureaucratic structures had some permanence, the Japanese 
occupation did alter the quality of education and state building. This is distinct from the 
effect of Japanese colonialism in South Korea (Kohli 1994). 
                                                             
3 In chapter 5, I provide a thorough explanation for the rise of classical liberalism in Europe during this 
period, and how it effects policy preferences in the Dutch parliament.  
4 According to Furnivall (1943), the primary school enrollment in the Netherlands East Indies was 
significantly behind its neighbors, Taiwan, Philippines, British Malaya, and in Thailand where the 
enrollment rates were three times higher than the Netherlands East Indies. 
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 My argument extends the canonical literature on colonialism by incorporating the 
influence of colonial educational policy on state building success, while at the same time 
exploring a different outcome – economists’ understanding of ‘state capacity’. The 
importance of colonial legacy has been predominantly addressed in the political economy 
literature and has particularly focused on economic development. To date, the literature 
has emphasized the importance of varying levels of European settlement for institutional 
quality in the colonies and the way that this contributed to divergent outcomes in 
economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Banerjee and Iyer 
2005; Feyrer and Sacerdote 2009; Sokoloff and Engerman 2000). There is considerable 
evidence that higher levels of European settlement had a broadly positive effect on 
economic development in former colonies through the transmission of institutions and 
codification of property rights. While these studies highlight the importance of colonial 
settlement for transmitting liberal institutions at the macro-level, the field still lacks an 
explicit assessment of how state-society relations under colonialism facilitated or 
hindered institutional transmission and the state capacity of these former colonies after 
independence.  
1.1 Contributions 
 
This study makes several contributions. First, it looks beyond economic growth to 
focus on other outcomes impacted by colonial rule—namely education attainment levels 
and state institutions. This study follows the many cross-national studies contemplating 
the influence of colonialism but diverges by focusing on an overlooked dependent 
variable—state capacity.  Moreover, this study tests the relationship between the level of 
European settlement and contemporary state capacity, which has not been done before in 
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the literature. At the same time, the project investigates the development of state capacity 
in the literature and the link between its theoretical form and operationalization.   
The second and main contribution of this study is an exploration of the influence 
of colonial inclusivity in the realm of education on the quality of the bureaucracy, which 
in turn affects contemporary state capacity and economic development. This concept, 
colonial inclusivity, reflects the level at which colonial administrators (located both 
within the colony and in the sending state) invested in the human capital of the colonized 
population. At the core of this investigation is an argument that education (the tool) and 
the development of human capital (the result) are instrumental to state building. This 
argument for colonial inclusivity extends the framework of Reo Matsuzaki (2019) who 
argues that the colonial state developed a connection with society via indigenous 
intermediaries who were agents of the state, who were also deeply connected to the 
indigenous population via a shared identity and values. According to Matsuzaki, these 
intermediaries were instrumental to helping the colonial state foster compliance from the 
population for colonial objectives. My argument takes this logic a step further by adding 
that education and higher levels of educational attainment helped socialize the indigenous 
population to the point of becoming invested in the colonial state and state building 
efforts. Additionally, as the standards for entrance into the public service became more 
meritocratic, education served as a means of incorporating the indigenous population into 
the bureaucracy. This was prominently seen in colonial contexts that necessitated more 
non-Europeans to help fuel the state.  
The infusion of more access to western, liberal education towards the end of the 
19th century distinguishes colonies that experienced leadership vacuums (e.g. Belgian 
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Congo) and those that did not (e.g. Netherlands East Indies). Arguably, in most colonial 
contexts European leaders used intermediaries or co-opted local leaders to squelch 
uprisings from within the population and to fortify compliance from the population. This 
strategy is also seen in the slave colonies of North America and the Caribbean. An 
important distinction between the colonies wherein co-optation was the dominant strategy 
and those that used a mix of this strategy and intentional or unintentional empowerment 
via education, is that post-colonial leaders were better equipped to continue state building 
projects.  
To understand why this variation in strategy exists, I return to my opening 
statement and reiterate that this theory of colonial inclusivity is the product of the 
interaction between the metropole and domestic structures. This interaction can be 
organized into what was going on in the metropole and how that influences the policy 
implemented in the colony. In the metropole, the shift in general policy in the colonies 
can be attributed to rise of classical liberalism in Europe’s parliaments during the 19th 
century and the shifting economic interests of the colonizer, but this did not naturally 
translate into the building of institutions that would have permanence after independence. 
Rather, the formation of inclusive institutions, such as educational institutions and 
bureaucracies that provided greater access to the indigenous population, ultimately led to 
institutional transmission that has endured. Therefore, the interaction between the 
metropole and the polity contributed to contemporary state capacity in former colonies.  
Moreover, these early investments in state building had important long-term 
consequences. As Mahoney (2010, 204) argues, the trajectory of post-colonial institutions 
was marked by path dependent increasing returns: 
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Countries with institutions that are advantageous at one point in time tend to have 
different but still advantageous institutions at a latter point. Effective institutions 
beget other effective institutions, ineffective ones foster other ineffective ones. 
In the pages that follow, I build on Mahoney (2010), Matsuzaki (2019), and the existing 
literature by providing an explanation for how this path was created and sustained. I 
explain this process more fully in my main theoretical chapter, Chapter II, and investigate 
it quantitatively in Chapter IV.  
1.2 Colonial Studies in Political Science  
 
 The importance of this study for social science is demonstrated by a significant 
lacuna in the political economy literature of colonialism and economic development—
existing studies do not adequately explain how and why colonialism influenced post-
colonial states. Much of this literature, particularly in the discipline of economics, is 
driven by the question of whether historical levels of state institutional quality explain 
contemporary variation in national income levels. As such, most studies utilize two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) to avoid the endogeneity between wealth and state institutions. A 
few seminal studies do focus squarely on how colonialism influences states and societies 
(Kohli 1994; Lange 2003, 2009; Mahoney 2010; Matsuzaki 2019; Owolabi 2015, 2019). 
These studies, however, examine broader patterns of state-society relations. Rarely if ever 
do these studies give explicit attention to concepts such as institutional quality. There 
now exists a large literature on the colonial politics of state capacity, qualitatively 
understood, but there is little to no literature on how colonialism influenced 
contemporary state capacity as understood and measured by economists and public policy 
scholars. In short, there now exist two general literatures, one focusing on colonialism 
merely as an instrument in 2SLS, and the other more generally interested in colonialism 
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but without giving much explicit attention to property rights, quantitative measures of 
“state capacity”, and other related research. This dissertation advances a new research 
agenda by exploring the lacuna between these two prominent literatures.  
1.2.1 Situating this Study in the Literature 
 
 I now turn to a brief exploration of the two literatures noted above, focusing on 
the arguments most salient to this study. I then move into a close examination of the 
study that has been at the center of the political economy investigation of colonial legacy 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001).  
Contemporary colonial studies received much of its impetus from a number of 
studies arguing that European colonialism had a positive effect on the economic 
development of former colonies (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Easterly and 
Levine 2003; Englebert 2000; Engerman and Sokoloff 2002; Fails and Krieckhaus 2010; 
Kohli 1994; Lange 2003 and 2009; Mahoney 2010; Lange, Mahoney, and Vom Hau 
2006). Their explanations for why there are variant outcomes for how European 
colonialism affects former colonies can be organized into four main categories : 1) 
institutional incongruence between pre-colonial and post-colonial institutions can explain 
the divergence in economic growth and to a certain extent state capacity (Englebert 
2002); 2) colonial institutional arrangements were inherently adverse to long term growth 
particularly for colonies with high inequality (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002); 3) the 
building of bureaucratic structures and the embeddedness of the colonial apparatus 
fostered a “state-society synergy” leading to effective institutions for long term 
development (Lange 2003); and 4) variation in general colonial strategies by different 
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colonial regimes led to divergent outcomes in economic growth (Lange 2009). This 
growing body of work on the colonial origins of contemporary incomes is rich with 
datasets and causal insights but does not investigate the intervening process. The question 
remains: What exactly were these state institutions and how specifically was a high-
capacity state created and maintained?  
A second body of literature on colonialism moves us closer to an explicit 
examination of colonial strategy and its relevance for post-colonial state building 
(Englehart 2005; Fukuyama 2004; Hameiri 2009; Lange 2003; Matsuzaki 2019; Migdal 
1988 and 2009; Wantchekon; Klasnja, and Novta 2013; Xu 2017). Each of the 
aforementioned scholars implicitly theorizes about the effect of colonialism on one aspect 
of state capacity, typically institutional capacity. Two contemporary additions to the 
literature help situate this study. The first is Matsuzaki’s (2019) argument for the 
importance of mediational institutions for colonial state building. Specifically, Matsuzaki 
argues that colonial powers were able to impose state building onto colonized populations 
by coopting intermediaries, leaders and elites from within the colonized population, to 
maintain order and gain compliance with colonial policies. These intermediaries were 
able to leverage their various linkages with the population, for example as heads of 
religious organizations, in order to solicit, and in some instances, coerce compliance. This 
analysis provides some clarity for the intervening process that would make colonial 
institutions ripe for long-term durability.  
The second relevant study is Owolabi (2015, 2019 forthcoming) who argues that 
forced settlement colonies and colonial occupation colonies produced different outcomes 
for economic and human development, along with political legacies in former colonies. 
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Forced settlement colonies, like Mauritius, Guyana, and Trinidad, occurred during the 
“Age of Discovery in the New World and had predominantly migrant populations of 
African and Asian descent, brought there for agricultural production. On the other hand, 
colonial occupation colonies, like Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Uganda, were established 
during the second wave of colonialism in the late 19th century and had populations 
largely comprised of indigenous groups. Owolabi argues that the difference in population 
structures and having a ‘blank slate’5 led to the implementation of inclusive, legal 
administrative frameworks in forced settlement colonies, which was not always the case 
in colonial occupation colonies with stronger pre-existing structures. After independence, 
the economic and human development in forced settlement colonies, like Barbados, was 
not only better than their colonial occupation counterparts, but also developed countries 
like the United States, Australia, and United Kingdom. Like Lange (2009) and Mahoney 
(2010), Owolabi provides more clarity for why certain colonial strategies were selected 
and how certain colonial contexts led to different outcomes. 
 However, even these contemporary additions do not formulate an explicit theory 
of colonialism’s relation to post-colonial state capacity. Moreover, all except for 
Matsuzaki (2019) focus primarily on the effect of European settlement on post-colonial 
state building. I argue, by contrast, that understanding colonial practice is profoundly 
important, because state capacity is at the heart of long-run modernization of the state, 
strength of the economy, and economic distribution (Fukuyama 2004; Grindle 1996; 
Hendrix 2010; Laking 2010; Migdal 1988). Additionally, studying state capacity is 
                                                             
5 Scholars like Owolabi argue that colonial projects that occurred in territories with limited or no central 
government, operated on a blank slate and were able to implement state building and extraction efforts 
more freely.  
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important for the living conditions of populations across the globe, because it provides us 
with the tools for improving these conditions. 
 The central purpose of this dissertation is to join Matsuzaki (2019) in providing 
more context to the intervening process in colonial studies, in which “institutions” are 
said to exist in colonial territories and subsequently persist among post-colonial 
populations. As an example of how the existing literature is overly top-down, ignoring 
the intervening processes, consider Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson’s (2001) 
prominent statement that extraction or violent exploitation of resources in colonies, and 
the erection of absolutist governments, adversely affected post-colonial institutional 
quality. The structure of colonial governments in their view was predicated on the level 
of settlement, with settler colonies being modeled after the home country, leading to good 
institutions after independence (2001, 1574). Alternatively, in non-settler colonies there 
was high economic motivation, which led to the erection of predatory institutions for 
extraction purposes (2001, 1575). Overall, the internal logic of Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson’s argument is that extractive and predatory institutions persisted after 
independence due to: 1) the costliness of setting up institutions that respect property 
rights; 2) the size of the selectorate or the ruling elite who had an incentive to maintain 
the status quo; and 3) the willingness of  agents of the state to invest in property rights 
institutions when they have more to lose. 
 What is missing from their analysis is the very real presence and agency of the 
colonized population, and how European settler efforts affected the context and condition 
of their agency. This means that the literature has largely depicted colonized populations 
as passive recipients of colonial institutions. This assumes that they were equipped and 
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inclined to run with the institutions created by European settlers, but there is no 
explanation for how or why this might have happened. In essence, existing explanations 
for colonial institutional transmission do not provide much clarity on how this process 
occurred, with the colonized population as part of the analyses, and what incentivized or 
better yet socialized the colonized population, particularly post-independence leaders, to 
adopt these institutions. This dissertation is an attempt to address the transmission 
process, exploring the reasons for variations in colonial strategy and how these variations 
in led to varying outputs for human capital, thus can explaining divergent outcomes in 
contemporary state capacity.  
1.3 Plan of the Dissertation 
 
The primary goal of this dissertation is to assess the influence of colonial 
education policies on contemporary levels of state capacity. Chapter II explains in more 
depth the broader theoretical contribution of this study—how colonial inclusivity shapes 
state building in former colonies and ultimately influences contemporary state capacity. 
The chapter articulates the logic of the theory of colonial inclusivity and also provides 
some background context on how shifts in the metropole influence how policies were 
implemented in the colony. 
In Chapter III, I explore in greater depth the definition and operationalization of 
state capacity by empirically testing the relationship between the existing indicator for 
colonialism in the literature—levels of European settlement—and prominent indicators of 
state capacity across the political economy literature. The primary focus of the existing 
literature is on the influence of colonialism on economic development, and it finds, 
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broadly, that the colonies with a higher percentage of European settlers experienced 
higher economic growth. My work complements this literature by moving beyond 
colonialism as an “instrument” that matters for growth to take seriously the causal 
process underneath.  
In the next empirical chapter, Chapter IV, I introduce a new measure of colonial 
policy—the level of educational attainment—and assess its significance for the 
prominent indicators of state capacity examined in Chapter III. I test the theory of 
colonial inclusivity as proxied by the level of educational attainment, while also 
accounting for existing explanations of post-colonial economic development, such as the 
level of European settlement, economic growth, geographic location, and pre-colonial 
institutions. I find that higher levels of educational attainment at the turn of the 20th 
century offers a more robust explanation for higher levels of contemporary state capacity 
than the alternatives. 
Chapter V is a case study exploring how the causal mechanism—colonial 
inclusivity—contributes to colonial state building efforts that increase long-term state 
capacity. Specifically, I trace the development of education policies towards the 
indigenous population and the inclusion of the indigenous population in the colonial 
bureaucracy of the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia). I demonstrate the covariation of 
educational policies and state building and provide evidence that this covariation was 
intentional. Finally, I conclude this project with a synthesis of the themes explored and 
results of each chapter, in Chapter VI.  
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Chapter II: COLONIAL INCLUSIVITY AND STATE 
CAPACITY 
 
“[Institutions] evolve incrementally, connecting the past with the present and the future; 
history in consequence is largely a story of institutional evolution in which the historical 
performance of economies can only be understood as a part of a sequential story.” 
Douglass C. North (1991) 
 
In this chapter, I aim to move the scholarship on colonial legacy forward with an 
examination of colonial inclusivity and state capacity. Here, I focus on one historical set 
of policies—education—and examine its impact on bureaucratic institutions that became 
part of the fabric of state building over time. This process of linking historical education 
policies and human capital accruement, most notably during the colonial era, is offered as 
an explanation for contemporary levels of state capacity achieved. 
Moreover, this study examines the influence of varying levels of educational 
proliferation across the whole of the colonial world to make inferences about its effect on 
state building. Much of this analysis focuses on the early part of the 19th century through 
to modern times, when liberalism emerged in Europe. The theory introduced here does 
not account for pre-colonial conditions, nor provide a remedy for the fact that this 
analysis is still deeply rooted in the effect of European colonialism on the colonized, and 
not vice versa. Where this assessment diverges from the existing scholarship is in its 
examination of how decisions directly relevant for the human development of the 
colonized affected state building and their governance options post-independence. 
Here, I focus on education rather than any other policy, for a few reasons: 1) 
greater educational access serves as a means to connect the colonial state with the 
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society; 2) the use of education as a socialization tool aids in legitimizing the colonial 
state and moving a critical mass of the population from compliance to endearment; and 3) 
it equips the population to participate in the state as civil servants. These three functions 
have several implications for state building before and after independence. First, 
socialization and professionalization through education empowers the population and 
equips it for self-rule after independence. Second, in contexts where colonial education 
policies led to higher educational attainment levels amongst the colonized population and 
where this was coupled with access to civil service positions, institutional transmission 
was more apt to occur. Moreover, state building in the long term was more successful in 
such colonies than in colonies in which these processes did not occur.  
In the coming pages, I first briefly address the literature on the determinants of 
contemporary state capacity to set the foundation for how this study fits into the canon, 
aiming to explain what factors contribute to state capacity. I then provide further 
theoretical background for the literature that precedes this study, to lay the foundation for 
why this study matters. After establishing where this study fits, I explain in greater detail 
how this investigation of colonial inclusivity will be incorporated in the rest of this study.   
2.1 Determinants of State Capacity 
 
At the core of this study is the goal of moving forward the discipline’s 
understanding of the determinants of state capacity. Thus far, much of the literature on 
the determinants of state capacity has explored the post-colonial African context. From 
this discourse, three explanations for the determinants of state capacity have been 
provided. The first is rooted in the scholarship on civic culture and social trust as a 
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precondition for institutional quality (Almond and Verba 1963; 1980; Coleman 1990; 
Fukuyama 2005; Putnam 1994), which lends itself to the social capital economic theory 
(Coleman 1990; Keefer and Knack 1997; La Porta et al. 1999; Widner and Mundt 1998). 
The social capital economic theory suggests that African institutional stagnation can be 
explained by low levels of civic culture and economic development. An extension of this 
line of reasoning is that vertical patron-client relations prevented the political 
participation and equality necessary for high levels of institutional quality (Dia 1996; 
Seragddin and Taboroff 1994). 
A second explanation for the determinants of state capacity relates to ethnic 
heterogeneity. Borrowing from Olsen’s (1965; 1982) theory of collective action, scholars 
argue that ethno-linguistic fractionalization in many African states makes it difficult for 
accountability inducing collective action, contributing to weak institutions and the 
adoption of subpar policies. Finally, a third—and the most relevant explanation for this 
study—emphasizes the inheritance of artificial states as the result of the Berlin 
Conference of 1884-85. This inheritance of states that were cobbled together after 
independence led to neo-patrimonial strategies that comprised the redistribution of 
resources for the sake of power maximization at the expense of the state (Bayart 1993; 
Boone 1994; Bratton and van de Walle 1994: Clapham 1982; Englebert 2000a; Jackson 
and Rosberg 1982; Medard 1982; Sandbrook and Barker1985; Sandbrook 1986; Lewis 
1996).6 
                                                             
6 I recognize that this is a truncated explication of the state capacity literature. I explore in greater depth 
the literature on state capacity in Chapter 3. However, it is important to mention that less is known about 
what determines state capacity than is known about how state capacity affects economic outcomes.  
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While these assessments of the determinants of state capacity in Africa are 
helpful, the influence of colonial strategies on governance in post-colonial Africa is not 
as pronounced as it could be. In studies where the influence of colonialism is addressed, 
it is usually briefly mentioned in the text or in a footnote. Yet, much of the contemporary 
political, economic, and social issues in many post-colonial countries, including African 
countries, can and have been traced back to the colonial period. Momentarily, I will 
explore some of the literature that supports this claim. In the next chapter, I return to 
exploring the determinants of state capacity in the context of colonial legacy, while more 
carefully treating the supporting literature.    
2.2 Theoretical Background 
 
Much of the political science literature on the significance of colonial legacy for 
current sociopolitical trends is situated within political economy. Exploring the political 
economy of colonialism is an exercise in what created the divergence between the 
legacies of some colonies relative to others. There is little explicit scholarship on the 
influence of colonialism on state building and contemporary capacity, although there are 
some scholars explored here who implicitly theorize about colonial legacy and state 
capacity. Thus, I explore the canon of scholarship trying to make sense of colonial legacy 
and economic development, because there is evidence to suggest that the same factors 
that influence economic growth also influence good governance (Careaga and Weingast 
2003; Knack and Keefer 1995; Mauro 1995; North 1991; Rodrik, Subramanian, and 
Trebbi 2004). This exploration also provides a window into the many preconditions that 
ultimately affects the varying levels of colonial inclusivity.  
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The first set of scholars I explore are seated within the tradition of debating 
whether “institutions matter” and whether institutional transmission is most relevant for 
post-colonial economic outcomes. The second set of scholars I explore point to the 
importance of human capital-creating institutions for long term economic development. 
These two scholarship traditions are the basis for the argument put forth here. Also, the 
highlighted gaps in the literature serve as evidence of the cruciality of this study for 
moving both discourses forward. This is to say that it is not enough to understand how 
colonial institutional choices affected the economic conditions of former colonies, but it 
is essential that we understand how this ultimately affects the governments that set the 
parameters for post-colonial economies.  
2.2.1 Colonial Institutional Transmission 
 
The most relevant political economy literature for this study assesses colonial 
legacy with an emphasis on the importance of colonial institutional transmission for 
economic development. To be clear, for the scholars explored here colonial legacy is the 
product of the institutions that colonizers left in their various territories. The state of the 
literature can be graphically depicted as the following figure:  
Figure 2.1: Institutional Transmission and Economic Development 
 
Now, it is not a new argument that institutions erected during the colonial era continue to 
be relevant well after independence, even when it was not immediately evident in its 
wake. However, studies of the staying power of colonial institutions have only emerged 
European settlement Institutional Transmission Postcolonial economic  development
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in the last thirty years, and they have predominately focused on the lasting effects of 
colonial institutions on economic growth.  
One of the earliest assessments of its kind was Kohli (1994) who argued that 
Japanese colonialism, although brutal, imported institutions from Japan that helped shape 
South Korea into its high growth path of development. This study is important, because 
Kohli (1994) links the transmission of Japanese institutions to Korean leaders prior to 
independence to post-colonial economic growth in South Korea. This study occurred at 
the height of the new institutionalism paradigm that argues that institutions influence 
human behavior through norms, rules, and other constructs.  
This argument is picked up by Evans and Rauch (1999) who argue that the type of 
institutions being transmitted are important for economic development, connecting the 
adoption of a meritocratic (i.e. recruitment based on education and examination) 
Weberian state with higher levels of economic growth. Granted, Evans and Rauch (1999) 
do not explicitly examine colonial legacy, but their argument, coupled with Kohli’s, 
suggests that the form that institutions take matters—preference given to Weberian 
institutions in the former—and that their transmission either through colonialism or 
globalization continues to have contemporary relevance.  
Returning to the relationship between the transmission of colonial institutions and 
economic growth, Englebert (2000) refines Kohli’s analysis by highlighting the 
importance of a congruence between pre-colonial and colonial institutions for effective 
institutional transmission. In the context of Africa, Englebert argues that many African 
states suffer from the fact that their formal institutions implemented during the colonial 
era are not congruent with their informal institutions and norms. This incongruence 
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became worse after independence, as the disconnect between the institutions inherited 
and indigenous informal institutions imploded. Englebert’s analysis seems to suggest that 
some type of “glue” or means of socializing the population is necessary to connect the 
formal and informal institutions. Arguably, this glue is education, which Fukuyama 
(2013) and Evans and Rauch (1999) suggest is necessary for indoctrinating a population 
with norms or reprogramming a population for a new set of norms. 
Although much of the early scholarship within this discourse focused on the 
institutional conditions that could explain economic growth,7 in the early part of the 21st 
century scholars began to focus on the local environmental conditions that influenced 
colonial legacy.8 Most notably, Engerman and Sokoloff (2000) argue that factor 
endowments (i.e. soils, climates, and the size or density of the native population) 
predisposed colonies to certain development paths by influencing inequality in wealth, 
human capital, and political power. These factor endowments influenced the level of 
settlement9 by: 1) inhibiting the number of settlers in some climates while encouraging it 
in others; 2) encouraging certain colonial strategies over others due to population size and 
the density of their institutions; and 3) being home to soils that were conducive to certain 
crops relative to others. These differences in factor endowments can explain why certain 
colonies that were viewed as places of success during the colonial period, fell behind 
economically after independence. This meant that being part of the British empire was 
                                                             
7 I explore the political economy scholarship on the influence of colonialism in various aspects on 
economic growth, because this literature lends itself to any substantive investigation of colonial legacy 
and contemporary governance.  
8 Again, the literature thus far assumes that colonial legacy is the institutions that colonizers left. The 
literature explored in this section provides an alternative explanation—environmental factors informs and 
constrains colonial policy—for the assumption that institutional transmission determined colonial legacy.  
9 The literature after Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) begins to connect the level of settlement 
with the type and quality of institutions transmitted to the colonized population during the colonial 
period and after independence.  
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not a guarantee of growth (Greene 1988; Kupperman 1995), even though there is 
scholarship that suggests that it was. In fact, there are those who argue that Myanmar 
inherited weak institutions from the British, and that these institutions were more 
militaristic rather than Weberian (Englehart 2005). Moreover, great inequality in the 
distribution of wealth and human capital in colonies (i.e. mostly black and slave labor 
colonies like the Caribbean islands) meant poor economic performance after 
independence. In colonies where there was a more equitable distribution of wealth and 
higher levels of education, such as the United States and Canada, there was opportunity 
for the innovation necessary for high levels of economic growth to transpire.  
Easterly and Levine (2003) modify this factor endowment explanation by arguing 
that factor endowments do not have a direct effect on economic development, but instead 
affect development through their influence on institutions. This moves the literature back 
to an institutional transmission explanation of colonialism’s effect on economic 
development. For Easterly and Levine (2003), temperate, ecological influences on 
diseases, and environments are the factor endowments that mattered most for institutions 
and that were conducive to certain crops. This can be simplified to tropics, germs, and 
crops. First, Easterly and Levine argue that European settlement was much higher in 
climates that were more temperate. Europeans were also more likely to stay and govern 
directly in such cases. This intersected with germs that the European settlers were not 
acclimated to, which dictated whether the European settlers were forced to implement 
extractive institutions or were able to settle and implement Weberian institutions. Thus, 
the institutional options of the settlers responded to the environment, and the economy 
responded to the institutions implemented. In fact, there are those that argued that “good” 
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institutions were mainly a product of non-tropical climates (Hall and Jones 1999). 
Second, climate prescribed what crops were able to be grown and exploited (Bloom and 
Sachs 1998; Landes 1998; Sachs 2001), which contributed to different colonial 
strategies—institutions—that structured how colonial powers exploited the territory, its 
people, and its resources. In settler colonies where more Weberian institutions were 
implemented, it made adopting better productivity techniques and technologies easier and 
more likely. Some would argue that germs and crops directly affected the technological 
developments of a society in the long run (Diamond 1997). Interestingly, Easterly and 
Levine (2003) intuit that “economic policies and institutions reflect current knowledge 
and political forces. Thus, changes in either knowledge about which policies and 
institutions are best for development or changes in political incentives will produce rapid 
changes in institutions and economic policies (2003, 4)." They conclude that history does 
not matter, and adverse historical legacies can be reversed. Yet, the historical record does 
not seem to suggest that Easterly and Levine (2003) are correct in assuming that these 
adverse trajectories are easy to reverse if at all (Callahan 2009; De Juan and Pierskalla 
2017; Frankema 2013; Pepinsky 2016; Pierson 2000; Wantchekon, Klasnja, and Novta 
2013; Xu 2017). 
 Breaking from this emphasis on environmental conditions and how they affected 
institutional transmission, Lange (2003) argues that a state-society synergy is necessary 
for the effective transmission of European institutions. Lange argues that the 
establishment of the bureaucratic state under the French and British in Mauritius was 
effective because it was accompanied by a society with deep associational ties. This 
harkens back to scholars like Putnam (1993) who argue for the importance of social 
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capital and trust for state building. The marriage between coherence within society and 
embeddedness of the relationship between the state and society contributes to the staying 
power of Weberian institutions transmitted during the colonial era. Mauritius is unique in 
the context of post-colonial Africa, because a development in the 1930s created a synergy 
between state-society critical for state building, which did not occur in other colonial 
African contexts. To this point, Lange argues that a "prolonged period of labor riots 
beginning in the late 1930s and the more interventionist policy of the British government 
after World War II combined to initiate a "critical-juncture period" that increased 
relations between state and societal actors (2003, 397)." This state-society synergy 
contributed to broad-based development and the strengthening of state institutions and 
societal associations that mattered after independence. There was such a synergy between 
the state and society prior to independence that 93% of state positions were held by 
Mauritians. The question then becomes, how did this come to be?  
What is missing from this story and many of those explored thus far is the 
influence of education on whether colonized bodies rejected the new parameters being 
imposed on them, or ingrafted them into their sociopolitical structures. Descriptive 
statistics suggest that the level of educational attainment in Mauritius was comparable to 
that of Hong Kong, which may explain the efficacy of its bureaucracy during the colonial 
period and after independence. Arguably, this institutional efficacy had significant 
positive economic ramifications. 
 Relatedly, Banerjee and Iyer (2005) add that land revenue institutions were 
particularly important for the differences in economic outcomes. In context where 
cultivators rather than landlords were empowered with property rights, there were higher 
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agricultural investments and productivity post-independence. For areas where landlords 
were institutionally extended property rights, even where land reforms were enacted, the 
class-based antagonism between landlord versus non-landlord created ongoing conflicts 
and squelched collective action (2005, 1191). I add that these dynamics noted by 
Banerjee and Iyer (2005) in terms of property rights institutions and the differences 
produced by those who were empowered, worked in tandem with empowerment via 
education.  
 As an extension of this idea that colonial institutions matter, Lange, Mahoney, 
and vom Hau (2006) return to an exploration of whether colonial identity, in and of itself, 
matters. They argue that the differences in the economic models of Britain and Spain had 
large consequences for their preferred areas of settlement, the level of colonial 
institutional building— “the extent to which a colonizing power installs economic, 
political, and sociocultural institutions in a colonized territory” —and the subsequent 
development legacies (2006, 1414). They also refute the evidence related to factor 
endowments, by arguing that similar factor endowments produced different levels of 
institutional establishment by the Spanish and British. Instead, a better predictor of 
colonial strategy was pre-colonial levels of development, which positively influences the 
level of Spanish colonialism, but negatively affects the level of British colonialism. This 
emphasis on the level of colonialism is refuted by Sacerdote and Feyrer (2009) who argue 
that the timing and length of time that colonialism occurred rather than the type of 
settlement matters. Specifically, early during the colonial period the choice of what 
territories to subdue relative to others was in part dictated by windspeeds (i.e. this was 
before the invention of the steam engine). They find that the timing of colonization 
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matters for contemporary economic growth, and colonies that were colonized after 1700. 
Colonies that were colonized after the 1700s experienced a more liberal and innovative 
colonialism, relative to colonization that happened prior to this ideological shift in 
Europe (i.e. Spanish colonialism). 
Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau (2006) and Sacerdote and Feyrer (2009) help us 
understand why certain colonies were colonized, by whom, and to a certain extent when. 
I add that the preconditions explored here that affected the level of colonialism and 
timing naturally had an impact on the extent that the colonizers were willing to invest in 
the development of the population. Notably, colonialism ended in most of Latin America 
by the early part of the 19th century, with the last independence movement occurring in 
Uruguay in 1828 (Sacerdote and Feyrer 2009).10 This is significant, because Europe 
began to liberalize at the beginning of the 19th century. This classic liberalism 
emphasized the importance of protecting the self against encroachment from the state, 
including the extension of property rights and civil liberties. A result of the expansion of 
classic liberal thinking was a shift in policymaking in Europe and a corresponding shift in 
their perception of their responsibility to colonial territories. Prior to the 19th century, 
Europe had already begun to proliferate numerous educational institutions, and this 
finally began to surface in many of its colonies a little later in the century. Thus, I 
recognize that the timing of colonialism matters for the extent of European investment in 
the populations they subdued. In this regard, colonial inclusivity may be a function of 
both timing and the related ideological shifts in Europe. I return to the importance of 
                                                             
10 Cuba was the last Spanish colony to receive independence from Spain in 1899, nearly 7 decades after 
the rest of Latin America. 
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ideological developments in Europe, in the next section presenting the crux of my 
argument and state capacity. 
 The argument for the importance of timing over colonial identity, which 
influenced strategy, is supported by Fails and Krieckhaus (2010) who argue that the 
influential story presented by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) loses much of its 
strength when the neo-Europes are removed from their analysis. This is to say that even 
though the British were exceptional at restructuring the societies of The United States, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, this did not translate the same way into its other 
colonies. Here, the timing and even the density of the population11 intersect to mute some 
of the positive effects attributed to British colonialism, in the context of economic 
growth. They conclude their study with the insight that human capital is potentially a 
more viable intervening process for how institutions affect economic development (2010, 
507). This assessment provides a natural segue in to the literature that investigates the 
missing link in the story on colonial legacy I explore here.  
2.2.2 Human Capital-Creating Institutions 
 
 The first step towards understanding how colonial inclusivity matters for state 
capacity is provided by Glaeser et al (2004) who argue that the European share of the 
population matters for the transmission of human capital and human capital creating 
institutions. This logic regarding the level of European settlement is found in the writings 
of Easterly and Levine (2012) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). Glaeser et 
al. (2004) argue that human capital creating institutions have implications for economic 
                                                             
11 All the neo-Europes are characterized by their predominately European settlement, as the result of 
large-scale genocide and uprooting indigenous populations. These include the United States, New 
Zealand, Australia, and Canada. 
27 
 
development over time. This divergence from the institutional transmission paradigm is 
graphically depicted as: 
Figure 2.2: Human Capital and Economic Development 
 
Glaeser et al. (2004) stop short of connecting these human capital creating 
institutions with state building and state capacity. I move the scholarship forward by 
adding that these human capital creating institutions were important for other institutions 
and state building, which in turn influenced economic development. In particular, the 
quantity and quality of human capital creating institutions implemented during the 
colonial era maintain their significance in former colonies.  
This idea of connecting mass education with governance has some origin in 
Ulsaner and Rothstein (2014) who link mass education in 1870 to corruption levels in 
2010 for 78 countries; finding a positive relationship between universal education and the 
control of corruption. This is one of the first known times in the literature where the 
influence of educational attainment levels is assessed for any aspect of governance. 
Ulsaner and Rothstein (2014) argue that more equitable education policies empower 
citizens to oppose corruption. Moreover, the need for higher state capacity was a 
motivation for introducing universal education. 
The study that provides the most justification for this extension of the literature is 
Frankema’s (2013) examination of the influence of colonial education on post-colonial 
governance. In this qualitative assessment, Frankema (2013) compares the colonial 
education practices in the Belgian Congo and Indonesia, to investigate how the variation 
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in colonial education development influences a government’s capability for political and 
macro-economic stability. In particular, Frankema emphasizes the importance of 
education for the development of indigenous nationalist leadership. For the Belgian 
Congo, he argues that the expansion of primary education to a broader swath of the 
population, without greater access to higher education and civil service positions 
contributed to nationalist leaders without the necessary skills to implement post-
independence policies that promoted economic stability. Conversely, Frankema argues 
that even though Indonesia did not expand educational access as broadly as the Belgian 
Congo, the population including nationalist leaders had avenues to higher education and 
the civil service. After independence, nationalist leaders were more skilled, and in the 
long-term, were able to implement policies that created more economic stability than 
their counterparts in the Congo.  
Relatedly, Owolabi (2015, 2019 forthcoming) argued that forced settlement 
colonies and colonial occupation colonies produced different outcomes for economic and 
human development, along with political legacies in former colonies. Owolabi argues 
that the difference in population structures led to the implementation of inclusive, legal 
administrative frameworks in forced settlement colonies, which was not always the case 
in colonial occupation colonies with stronger pre-existing structures. After independence, 
the human development in forced settlement colonies, like Barbados, were better than 
colonial occupation colonies.  
The major difference between these studies and this study is that I theorize and 
empirically assess the consequences of colonial mass education policies for state 
building. I also connect the emergence of human capital creating education policies in the 
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colonies with the appearance and evolution of classical liberalism in Europe and the 
metropole’s economic interest. 
2.3 Colonial Inclusivity and State Capacity 
 
Two assumptions are at the foundation of this investigation of colonial inclusivity 
and state capacity. The first is that the formation of the bureaucratic state was a purposive 
endeavor. This is supported by Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985) who argued that the 
construction and development of the bureaucratic state does not indeed occur on a whim, 
by a few leaders at independence, but rather is the culmination of state building practices 
prior to and after independence. In order to holistically understand what causes a state to 
be effective, one must delve into the past and isolate the essential historical events that 
established their trajectories for state building (Gryzmala-Busse 2011; Pierson 2000). 
 The second observation is that state building is comprised of developing state 
institutions through the professionalization of the bureaucracy, in tandem with 
developing a civil society that reinforces the state by complying with its objectives 
(Matsuzaki 2019; Migdal et al. 1994). The importance of civil society for the 
development of the state, in the Weberian sense, means that state building cannot be 
divorced from a dual building of society’s capacity. When state building exists in a 
context where civil society is weak, the state is likely to regress into monarchical or 
dictatorial forms of governance. Thus, this observation implies that our assessments of 
state building must take into consideration the development of both the state and society. 
Divorcing one from the other leads to causal explanations that are inherently lacking.  
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Given the above observation, this concept of inclusivity is two-fold. One aspect of 
the concept captures the extent to which the colonized population were given access to 
education, which serves as a mechanism for strengthening civil society. The second 
aspect is the extent to which the colonized population and this new educated class gained 
access to bureaucratic posts. There are some scholars who argue that the development of 
civil society springs from higher levels of education and income. I make the argument 
here that the economic empowerment of colonized populations occurred around the same 
time that liberal education was extended to a larger swath of the population. In part, these 
dual occurrences are what I mean by colonial inclusion.  
This first aspect of inclusivity fuels the second part of the concept, which is that 
the increase in educational attainment amongst the colonized population contributed to 
their increased desire for more posts within the colonial bureaucracy. Granted, there may 
have been contexts in which the colonized population received more education but were 
not given more opportunities within the state. However, the evidence explored in Chapter 
5 on the Netherlands East Indies suggests that the expansion of educational access could 
serve the colonizers’ intent to increase the number of bureaucrats needed to expand their 
colonial operation and impose state building (Matsuzaki 2019).  
Therefore, colonial inclusivity reflects the extent to which the colonial regime 
provided liberal, western education to the colonized population, and this vehicle for 
socialization into classical liberalism had the effect of developing their civil society. 
Likewise, the investment in education served the colonial regime’s purpose of increasing 
the number of bureaucrats to achieve their economic goals in the territory, while also 
developing a cadre of officials trained in running and building Weberian institutions. The 
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amalgam of these factors is what I mean by colonial inclusivity, and I argue that its 
legacy continues to have implications for contemporary state capacity 
 Moreover, this this investigation of colonial inclusivity and state capacity argues 
that the relevance of institutional transmission in explanations of colonial legacy touted in 
the literature thus far is the function of a two-stage process. The vast majority of the 
literature thus far has assumed that the transmission of Weberian institutions occurs as 
the result of European settlement and, particularly, higher levels of European settlement 
relative to the colonized population. These assessments implicitly assume that the 
presence of European settlers alone is enough, while ignoring the process by which 
bureaucracies became stronger in Europe beginning in the 19th century. Matsuzaki (2019) 
highlights the fact that the proto-bureaucracies in Europe were initially ineffective, 
because the hiring, training, and promotion practices were such that they lacked the 
professionalism and specialization that were the hallmarks of a rationally constituted 
bureaucracy.12 It was not until they implemented basic examination systems and in some 
cases forced all their aspiring bureaucrats to be trained at elite schools, as was the case in 
the French system, that the standardization of their training made them more effective 
bureaucrats. Moreover, Matsuzaki argues that this bureaucratic standardization was 
necessary for successful state building in Europe.  
Given that the bureaucratic institutions in Europe had to go through a 
standardization process via education, and these were the same institutions that the 
literature claims were being transmitted in the colonies, it follows that an investigation 
                                                             
12 In The Origins of Political Order, Francis Fukuyama (2011) identifies a rationally constituted bureaucracy 
as one where there is specialized education available to those with bureaucratic aspirations, exams are 
used for hiring decisions, and there is intentional cultivation of professionalized civil servants.  
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into how this same process took shape in the colonies. Here, I assess the role of inclusive 
educational access as an intervening process for facilitating the institutional transmission 
and adoption by colonized populations prior to and after independence. 
This investigation of an intervening process for colonial institutional transmission 
is also supported by Matsuzaki’s (2019) argument that the ability of the colonial state to 
garner support or at the very least compliance from the population was through 
mediational institutions and intermediaries, who were able to sway the population and 
foster compliance with policies such as taxation and public health edicts. Due to their 
personal connection with the indigenous population, intermediaries were able to induce 
compliance in ways that traditional agents of the state (e.g. civil servants) were unable to. 
Even though this addition to the literature is useful, I do not believe it provides a 
complete picture of how state building success occurred. 
  Colonial inclusivity provides another missing link by arguing that the 
transmission of Weberian institutions occurs as a result of inclusive colonial education 
policies that not only increased compliance with the state but reinforced the legitimacy of 
the state-building effort and moved a critical mass of society towards endearment and 
civil service. Naturally, the use of education as a state-building tool was not employed in 
every colony. On one hand, I attribute this variation to the rise of classical constitutional 
liberalism in Europe and the shifting economic interests of the colonizer. On the other 
hand, there were international externalities that were also consequential for colonial 
policy such as economic shocks, and the World Wars of the early twentieth century. 
Thus, realities in the metropole were relevant for what occurred in the colonies.  
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The second stage of this process is the actual implementation of the colonial 
education policy. As other scholars have mentioned, the success of implementation was 
contingent on several factors, such as local institutional structures (Mahoney 2010), the 
extent that the colonial state was able to enlist indigenous intermediaries to persuade the 
population to attend school (Matsuzaki 2019), factor endowments that dictated where and 
what resources were exploited (Bloom and Sachs 1998; Diamond 1997; Easterly and 
Levine 2003; Engerman and Sokoloff 2000; Hall and Jones 1999; Landes 1998; Sachs 
2001) and whose perception of the population’s value as human beings (Chatterjee 1993; 
Bhabha 1994; Go 2004; Said 1976; Todorov 1986). All of these factors would be difficult 
to tease out here, but in instances where these factors permitted the implementation of 
inclusive educational policies, these human-capital-creating institutions empowered the 
population. Additionally, it equipped the colonized population to enter the colonial 
bureaucracy if granted access, and meaningfully contribute to long-term state building 
efforts.  
The overall process can be depicted as per Figure 3.  This figure provides a 
typology of the complex causal process at play when thinking about how colonial 
education policy could influence contemporary state capacity. The overall causal process 
is obviously much too complex to test, such that my core hypothesis remains a simple 
one, which is that higher levels of colonial education lead to more effective states. The 
complex causal process through which this happens, and the historical roots of such 
colonial policies, are not tested in this dissertation, but a brief overview provides the 
intellectual context for the specific hypothesis I am advancing. 
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Figure 2.3: Colonial Inclusivity and State Capacity 
 
Below, I explain how the processes of the education mechanism serves state building and 
contemporary state capacity.  
2.3.1 The Metropole 
 
This theory of colonial inclusivity and state capacity begins with an assessment of 
how inclusivity takes shape during the colonial era. There are two factors that influence 
the metropole’s adoption of inclusive colonial education policy. The first is the 
emergence of classical liberalism in Europe. The evolution of classical liberalism in 
Europe ultimately led to a shift in perceptions about individual rights and the role of the 
state in developing individuals. This shift that occurred in the metropole translated into 
their colonial policy in their occupied territories. It goes without saying to which the 
extent that classical liberalism trickled into colonial policy varied from one European 
power to the next and was influenced by their interests within a given colony, their 
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perception of the colonized population, and the conditions on the ground.13 In colonies 
where there were higher levels of classical liberalism expressed in policies, there was a 
higher likelihood that educational institutions were built and expanded. The result of this 
colonial education expansion was the socialization of the colonized population into 
western norms. Thus, the emergence of classical liberalism in Europe contributed to 
colonial agendas that built civil society in the colonies in which it was expressed. This 
shift is important for state-society building, because the co-development of both is at the 
core of developing strong states (Migdal et al. 1994). The type of strong state I am 
interested in explaining here is the emergence and development of the Weberian state.  
Prior to the 19th century, colonialism was largely extract, as demonstrated by 
mercantilist colonial powers like Spain and Portugal (Mahoney 2010). Colonialism began 
to take a different form after the 19th century due to policymaking shifts in Europe 
(Owolabi 2019). These policy shifts in Europe were due to the increasing popularity of 
classical constitutional liberalism in Europe, which emerged in the 18th century but came 
to prominence in Europe during the 19th century. Classical liberalism is distinct for giving 
precedence to individual freedom over excessive government encroachment on social, 
political, and economic life. For classical liberals, the government derives its legitimacy 
from the people, and the government is constrained by rule of law, with justice being 
meted out by codified processes and principles. Moreover, wealth is created by free 
individuals who are given the liberty to create, invent, invest, save, and exchange goods 
in a free market economy (Butler 2015). Distinct from his classical liberal counterparts 
who argued that the state should not have a monopoly over education, John Stuart Mill 
                                                             
13 These conditions on the ground include the temperate climate, germs and diseases, and tensions 
between pre-colonial leaders and European powers.  
36 
 
(1859) argued that, at the very least primary education, should be compulsory and 
provided by the state. Given JS Mill’s influence, this addendum to the central tenets of 
classical liberalism arguably paved the way for the expansion of primary education in 
Europe, and eventually, in the colonies.  
The materialization of classical liberal ideals most notably emerged in England. 
The political formation of this occurred as early as the 17th century, with the likes of John 
Lilburne (1614-57) and Richard Overton (c. 1610-63) who were anti-establishment 
figures. They advocated for the end of state monopolies and the protection of freedom 
and equal rights (Butler 2015, 18). Fast forward to the latter half of the 17th century 
during The Glorious Revolution, wherein William and Mary signed the Bill of Rights, 
which reinforced the rights and liberties of British subjects. This also granted the 
estranged Parliament stewardship over taxation, free elections, freedom of speech in 
Parliament, and the right to petition the government absent fear of retaliation (2015, 19). 
The Enlightenment, which mostly occurred during the 18th century, facilitated the 
emergence of classical liberalism in England, and similar schools of thought that 
propagated individual freedom in France, Italy, Scotland, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
Arguably, these ideological shifts in Europe had major implications for 
policymaking both domestically and abroad. Drawing from Mahoney (2010, 22), the 
political economy of a European nation at the time of its colonial project matters for the 
type of colonialism employed. In the timeframe explored here, the 19th and 20th 
centuries, the political economy of all the European colonial powers, was to varying 
degrees, liberal. Evidence from the Dutch and British East Indies suggests not only that 
Europe embraced liberalism ideologically, but also that this manifested itself in Europe’s 
37 
 
policy agendas (Butler 2015) and Europeans’ perceived responsibilities to their respective 
colonies. For example, in the middle of the 19th century Queen Wilhelmina of the 
Netherlands had Parliament pass the Dutch Ethical Policy, which reframed the nation’s 
responsibility to its colonial territories, and articulated an obligation to provide 
opportunities for the human development of the colonized population.  
The second factor that influences colonial inclusivity is the economic interest of 
the European colonizer. The European colonizer’s economic interests reflected the 
conditions under which exploration of other territories was a desire or a necessity. The 
difference between colonial exploration as a “need” or “want” helped determine the sort 
of institutions or systems of governance colonial powers put in place, in order to achieve 
their economic goals in a territory. Throughout the 19th century, there were significant 
economic shifts occurring in Europe that in some instances fueled a perceived necessity 
to explore areas that were more resource-rich. Thus, as constitutional liberalism spread in 
Europe and led to a shift in their perceived roles in the colonies, European colonizers also 
began to expand into new territories or deeper into existing protectorates to pursue their 
economic motivations.14 Notably, the British, Dutch, French, and Belgians began their 
expansions into resource-rich tropical Africa in the latter half of the 19th century, just as 
the Dutch began to extend their reach in the Netherlands East Indies to the archipelago’s 
outer islands. Given that tropical diseases inhibited extensive European settlement 
(Diamond 1997; Easterly and Levine 2003), this expansion coincided with the need to 
increase the skilled labor amongst the colonized population. Explicitly, the colonists 
needed some fraction of the colonized population to run the state institutions necessary 
                                                             
14 I delve deeper into these motivations in the case studies of Indonesia and Malaysia in Chapters 5 and 6.  
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for achieving their objectives in that territory.15 This economic necessity to empower the 
colonized populations contributed to state-building behavior and had the unintended 
consequence of building colonial civil societies as well. Again, the rise of classical 
liberalism and the desire for colonial expansion in the 19th century watered the seeds of 
society and state building.  
In sum, the existing literature has explored extensively—albeit not exhaustively—
how state building resulted from European powers’ desire to expand territorially and 
economically. From these investigations, there is a clear assumption that the natural 
outcome of European colonial powers extending the reach of the colonial state (Scott 
1998) was to create Weberian institutions. Here, I provide a more nuanced explanation 
emphasizing how Europe’s ideological and policy reforms, along with economic 
ambitions, led to the socioeconomic empowerment of some colonized populations. This 
becomes more evident in the next section, in the discussion of the development of 
colonial inclusivity and its effect on state capacity. 
2.3.2 The Colony 
 
The ideological and constitutional shift in Europe, along with colonial powers’ 
economic spread across the globe lended itself to two processes that ultimately 
contributed to strong contemporary state capacity: 1) the creation of educational 
institutions helped build society and promote the economic empowerment of the 
colonized population; and 2) granting the colonized population access to posts within the 
                                                             
15 Naturally, the type of institutions implemented and their perceived responsibility is also filtered 
through racialized prisms. Many of the European colonizers saw the world as divided between those who 
were full, rational humans and “savages”. The shift in perceived responsibility towards colonial 
populations was predicated on whether the colonizers recognized their humanity. Granted, this 
recognition of humanity was at varying degrees.  
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bureaucracy furthered state building. These two factors working together contributed to 
the long-term endurance of Weberian institutions. Additionally, these two processes 
occurred in many contexts almost simultaneously such that they reinforced each other.  
Furthermore, these two processes are part of my core argument that investing in 
education for the colonized population and granting them access to the bureaucracy 
during the colonial period, would prove consequential for postcolonial state building. 
This is especially true when those bureaucratic posts were not superficial, but at higher 
levels. The following exploration of western bureaucracies and their interaction with 
education provides evidence for how the processes outlined here reinforced each other 
and led to strong contemporary state capacity.  
While scholars go back and forth on what comprises a bureaucracy, here I use the 
Weberian definition of bureaucracy. Sociologist Max Weber (1922|2013) defined the 
characteristics of a modern bureaucracy as follows:  
1. Bureaucrats are subjected to authority only within fixed parameters and are free 
otherwise; 
2. Bureaucrats are organized into hierarchical offices with fixed parameters; 
3. Each of these offices have a definite sphere of influence; 
4. Hiring for each office is done via a free contractual relationship; 
5. Technical qualifications or merit is the basis of selection for job candidates; and 
6. Bureaucrats are compensated with fixed salaries.  
Fukuyama (2013) offered a few useful modifications to the Weberian definition of a 
bureaucracy by adding that the level of education and the professionalization of the 
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bureaucracy matters. In order to achieve the bureaucracy that Weber envisioned, 
Fukuyama argued that education is important, because it engrains those entering public 
service with a sense of commitment to the broader goals of the public and creates norms 
for the profession. Education also has the effect of inhibiting patronage and corruption 
(Evans and Rauch 1999, 752). This observation is extended by Ulsaner and Rothstein 
(2014) who link mass education in 1870 to corruption levels in 2010, arguing that more 
equitable education empowers citizens to oppose corruption within the state.  
 The connection between a professionalized bureaucracy and education is central 
to this study and is supported by the existing literature. The core features of a 
bureaucracy are the presence of fixed parameters, in terms of scope, salaries, and hiring 
practices, in addition to the importance of having a professionalized and educated 
bureaucracy. Since the record suggests that education is a necessary precondition for a 
Weberian bureaucracy, I argue that there is a level of intentionality that comes with 
building a bureaucracy, and that this intentionality in state building—rather than the 
alternative of happenstance—was not only a feature of bureaucracies in Europe, but also 
in some territories European colonial powers sought to dominate. If the goal was to build 
an effective bureaucracy, particularly in colonies where the level of settlement was 
dampened by the territory’s geographic location (Landes 1998) or high mortality because 
of germs (Diamond 1997; Easterly and Levine 2003), the metropole had to be intentional 
about extending education to the indigenous and/or migrant slave populations (Owolabi 
2019). Again, this did not occur in all colonies, and this varied across time within 
colonies. Moreover, Green (1990) argues that skilled labor that stems from higher levels 
of human capital (i.e. levels of educational attainment) within a population is essential for 
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effective state building. Herein lies the relevance of colonial inclusivity for understanding 
the legacy of colonialism—for better or for worse.  
 This concept, colonial inclusivity, reflects the level at which the European settlers 
invested in the human capital of the colonized population, and the degree to which the 
colonized were incorporated into the state. There are two things functioning in this 
concept: 1) I presume the primary form that human capital investment took was via 
educational policies that led to corresponding levels of educational attainment; and 2) 
investing in education equipped the colonized population with the skills necessary to 
participate in Weberian institutions that were built or modified by European settlers.  
This concept is rooted in the reality that colonialism was pervasive and that it 
changed the structure of society, at least at the center of colonial operations. Note that 
these centers often became the central government after independence. First, I argue that 
colonial practices were so pervasive and so successful in upending traditional 
socialization and mobility structures (Banerjee & Prasad 2008; Young 2004), that 
education was necessitated as a substitute. It should be noted that this destruction of 
traditional structures was less pronounced in large territories like India, or in territories 
with massive insurrection from pre-colonial authorities that maintained legitimacy, such 
as in many African territories. Second, for better or worse the new game in town was 
Weberian institutions that were devised to constrain the political, social, and economic 
interactions of society (North 1991). Thus, for state building to occur in the long term, 
members of the colonized population—even if it was only a select few—needed to be 
acclimated to the institutional practices they were inheriting to sustain and build upon 
them.  
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Naturally, the necessity of extending education to the indigenous or migrant slave 
population varied based on a number of factors: 1) the number of European bureaucrats 
settled in the territory (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001); 2) the land mass the 
colonizer desired to subdue; 3) the level of cooperation from the colonized and their 
leaders (Mahoney 2010; Matsuzaki 2019); 4) the economic conditions in the colonizing 
state (Mahoney 2010); 5) pre-colonial conditions limited or permitted greater liberty in 
building new institutions (Easterly and Levine 2012); and I add 6) the level of 
liberalization in the colonizing state. In this project, rather than engaging in a 2SLS 
assessment of all of the pre-conditions for colonial education policy, I test the 
relationship between level of educational attainment and prominent indicators of state 
capacity in Chapter IV.  
2.4 Summary 
 
A recurrent theme throughout the literature is that institutions are important for 
economic growth. This study provides an excellent point of departure for assessing what 
factors contributed to the transmission of colonial institutions and the successful adoption 
of those institutions before and after independence. One piece of this puzzle is Matsuzaki 
(2019) who argues that mediational institutions aided the colonial state in gaining 
compliance with its policy. I extend this further by arguing that the provision of 
education to more than just elites in the colonized population helped socialize the 
population and legitimize the state. In the long-term, this helped equip the population for 
the state building that has produced contemporary state capacity in the post-colonial 
world. 
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Furthermore, inclusive colonial education policies were most likely to be 
implemented in contexts where ideological shifts had occurred in the metropole, and this 
often but not always lent itself to greater access to the civil service. I also argue that when 
inclusive colonial education policies were present, the population was equipped to 
participate in state building during and after the colonial period. These things working in 
tandem and influenced the transmission of Weberian institutions akin to the Western 
world. It is important to note that this is not a statement about whether that was good or 
bad, but rather that state building that was reflective of western norms was most likely to 
occur in contexts where the colonized population was given access to western education 
and positions within the colonial state.  
Lastly, these processes also had the effect of extending economic rights to the 
colonized population. This is important, because Banerjee and Iyer (2005) note that the 
extension of property rights to cultivators rather than landlords during the colonial period 
was critical to economic development after independence. Evidence from Indonesia 
suggests that the extension of property rights to the colonized population was a precursor, 
not necessarily a cause, to the expansion of education beyond the European settler 
population to the colonized population. An improvement on Banerjee and Iyer’s (2005) 
argument is that the confluence of economic empowerment and higher levels of 
educational attainment contributed to the increased demand for positions of power in 
government from the native population in Indonesia, leading to the founding of the native 
corps of bureaucrats. This ultimately had implications for state building in the period just 
before independence and after independence. I assess this observation more closely in 
Chapter V and make inferences about its occurrence in other colonial contexts.  
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Chapter III: COLONIAL SETTLEMENT AND STATE 
CAPACITY IN POST-COLONIAL STATES 
 
The ongoing effect of colonial institutional quality on economic performance in 
post-colonial states has been of great interest to scholars in and outside of political 
science. Seminal works like Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) have emphasized 
the relationship between European colonial settlement levels’ indirect effect on long-term 
economic development through institutional quality, as an explanation for divergent 
outcomes in the post-colonial world.  
 In this chapter, I explore in greater depth the first part of Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson’s (2001) argument, the intervening process in which the level of settlement 
affects the quality of state institutions. In addition to Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
(2001), there are a number of scholars who argue that the percentage of the European 
population in colonial territories had a positive effect on their development via 
institutions (Banerjee and Iyer 2005; Feyrer and Sacerdote 2009; Sokoloff and Engerman 
2000). Here, I empirically assess the relationship between the level of European 
settlement and its enduring effect on contemporary state capacity in former colonies. I do 
this by testing the relationship between the prominent operationalization of colonialism—
level of European settlement—and the four indicators of state capacity (government 
effectiveness, bureaucratic quality, political constraints, and tax ratio) in 62 former 
colonies. Therefore, in this chapter I do not assess the relationship between my colonial 
inclusivity and contemporary state capacity, but rather focus on the predominant strategy 
scholars use to measure colonial legacy—the level of European settlement. Through an 
examination of the effect of the level of European settlement on a tripartite formulation of 
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state capacity--administrative, institutional, and fiscal capacity—I find that higher levels 
of European settlement had a positive effect on administrative and institutional capacity. 
This chapter makes two contributions to the social science literature on 
colonialism. First, this investigation deepens our understanding of colonial legacy by 
empirically assessing the causal relationship between the conventional measure of 
colonialism and a prominent explanatory variable—state capacity. Second, this 
investigation unpacks the nuances of state capacity and provides a more comprehensive 
way of conceptualizing and measuring the concept. I hypothesize and confirm that higher 
levels of European settlement had a positive effect on the forms of state capacity explored 
here—administrative, institutional, and fiscal capacity. These forms are part of the 
general understanding of state capacity and its diverse manifestations, which amounts to 
the ability of the state to implement its disparate preferences and resources into policies 
and services.16 These two contributions are important for this study of the intervening 
processes that led to institutional transmission, because it lays the groundwork for 
connecting colonialism to contemporary state capacity, before delving further into the 
practices of settlers once they arrived. 
As a brief overview of the methodology employed here, I test the relationship 
between European colonial settlement and state capacity, using four variables that are 
prominent in the literature on state capacity. In order to provide a more comprehensive 
operationalization of the concept, I employ bureaucratic quality from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) (PRS, 2006); government effectiveness from the Worldwide 
                                                             
16 While the state is often defined as an entity with a monopoly over coercive force or violence (Tilly, 
1985), I do not examine the relationship between the percentage of European settlers or level of 
settlement, and the coercive capacity of the state. 
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Governance Indicators (World Bank 2013); and tax revenue as a percentage of GDP 
(Gross Domestic Product) from the World Bank (World Development Indicators 2016); 
and the political constraints index (Henisz, 2000). I organize these variables into a three-
part typology: administrative capacity (i.e. bureaucratic quality and government 
effectiveness); institutional capacity (i.e. political constraints index); and fiscal capacity 
(i.e. tax revenue as a percentage of GDP). 
To test the hypothesis that the level of European settlement matters for state 
capacity, I utilize a cross sectional statistical test of the measures of state capacity, using 
62 observations from 2010 for the dependent variable. I find that a higher percentage of 
European settlers has a positive and significant effect on the three facets of state capacity 
in post-colonial states, even though the effect of settlement on fiscal capacity is not as 
pronounced. I also find a negative and significant relationship between settler mortality 
rate and state capacity. This affirms the Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson’s (2001) 
argument about the importance of favorable conditions for a higher percentage of 
European settlers and the resulting institutional quality. While the results of this study 
reinforce their argument, my contribution to the literature on state capacity and economic 
development is that colonialism as it is presently conceived in the literature has an effect 
on contemporary state capacity. This empirical assessment is the basis for this study of 
how European settlement matters for the transmission and adoption of Weberian 
bureaucratic institutions. 
In the next section, I revisit the discourses on colonial settlement and state 
capacity that motivate this study. Then, I make an argument for the relevance of studying 
state capacity as a dependent variable, with colonialism as the main explanatory variable. 
47 
 
After this, I explain the research design of this chapter followed by an explication of the 
analyses and results. I conclude with a discussion of the results, the importance of 
moving this line of research forward, and the potential for addressing future research 
topics. 
3.1 Level of Settlement and Institutional Quality 
 
 Prior to and since the seminal work of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), 
the literature on political economy has focused on the effect of colonialism on economic 
development in post-colonial states (Englebert 2000; Engerman and Sokoloff 2002; 
Lange 2003: 2009). Scholars that assess colonialism’s effect on economic growth can be 
organized into four explanations: 1) institutional incongruence between pre-colonial and 
post-colonial institutions can explain the divergence in economic growth and to a certain 
extent state capacity (Englebert 2002); 2) colonial institutional arrangements were 
inherently adverse to long-term growth particularly for colonies with high inequality 
(Engerman and Sokoloff 2002); 3) the building of bureaucratic structures and the 
embeddedness of the colonial apparatus fostered a “state-society synergy” leading to 
effective institutions for long term development (Lange 2003); and 4) variation in general 
colonial strategies by different colonial regimes led to divergent outcomes in economic 
growth (Lange, 2009).  
To a lesser extent, there have been a few studies that explicitly assessed the 
relationship between colonialism, state building, and state capacity (Migdal 1988; 2009; 
Fukuyama 2004; Englehart 2005; Hameiri 2009). While their historical analyses are 
helpful for understanding the intuitions behind how colonialism still matters, they stop 
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short of empirically assessing the relationship between colonialism and contemporary 
state capacity. Given the value of empirical evidence, an empirical test would only help 
to strengthen their claims about the effect of colonialism on contemporary state capacity. 
Thus, this chapter aims to fill this lacuna by first statistically exploring the relationship 
between these two prominent indicators. In chapter IV, I empirically assess the more 
nuanced approach presented in chapter II.   
 Before investigating the main contribution of this study, it is important to reflect 
on one of the first statistical examinations of the effect of colonialism on institutional 
quality—a derivative of state capacity—initially put forth by Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2001). They argue that extraction or violent exploitation of resources in 
colonies and the erection of absolutist governments adversely affected institutional 
quality in former colonies. The level of exploitation depended on the percentage of 
European settlers in relation to the colonized population, which influenced the structure 
of the colonial government. Settler colonies or colonies with high European settlement 
were typically modeled after the home country, which they intuit led to higher quality 
institutions after independence (2001, 1574). Alternatively, they argue that in non-settler 
colonies there was greater motivation to focus on economic exploitation, which led to the 
erection of predatory institutions--akin to Belgian colonization in the Congo--for 
extraction purposes (2001, 1575). This part of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson’s 
argument stems from early scholarship that suggests that the extractive institutions set up 
by European settlers persisted long after decolonization (Young 1994). The internal logic 
of their argument is that extractive and predatory institutions persisted after independence 
due to: 1) the costliness of setting up institutions that respect property rights; 2) the size 
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of the selectorate or the ruling elite who had an incentive to maintain the status quo; and 
3) the fact that these agents of the state may have only been willing to invest in property 
rights institutions if they had more to lose. Yet, it seems that institutions persisted even in 
colonies with few or no predatory institutions, which suggests that we should focus on 
why colonial institutions in general persisted.  
3.2 Why Study State Capacity? 
 
 While property rights are heavily studied in the economic literature, political 
scientists have a much broader conceptualization of state capacity. Generally, the 
assessment of state capacity as an explanatory factor for economic development is 
prevalent in political science scholarship (Besley and Persson 2010; Doner 1992; Doner, 
Richie, and Slater 2005; Englehart 2009; Fukuyama 2004; Migdal et al. 1994; Slater 
2005; Winters 2011).  Presently, the literature has not come to a consensus on what state 
capacity is and how it should be operationalized. Understanding state capacity is 
important, because state practice directly affects global health, environmental health, and 
human rights. Therefore, the implications that high or low levels of state capacity have 
for the quality of life for people around the world make understanding state capacity an 
important topic in its own right. In this chapter, I assume that the capacity of the state can 
be organized into three forms: 1) administrative capacity; 2) institutional capacity; 3) and 
fiscal capacity. 
 This understanding of state capacity is informed by the broader comparative 
politics literature on state building, and the political economy literature on economic 
development. Some of the earliest assessments of state capacity can be traced back to 
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Theda Skocpol (1985) who advocated for bringing the state back into political science 
analyses. From there, Barbara Geddes (1994) argued that state capacity is the state’s 
ability to implement decisions and translate its preferences into action. Some scholars 
argue that state capacity is comprised of four functions rather than one (i.e. institutional, 
technical, administrative, and political capacity) (Grindle, 1996),17 or that at the very least 
a distinction should be made between its scope and strength (Fukuyama, 2004). While 
Grindle's (1996) formulation of state capacity is one of the few that contemplate different 
forms of capacity, there is some overlap between administrative capacity (i.e. the ability 
of the state to make informed and rational decisions on how to exercise its power) and 
technical capacity (i.e. the ability of the state to organize itself and its resources for the 
public good). In the typology utilized here, I use this as justification to combine these two 
factors.  
 Apart from the state building literature, the most prominent conceptualizations 
and operationalizations of state capacity are economically based, in part because data for 
economic variables are more readily available. As mentioned previously, this 
understanding of state capacity is often used as a key explanatory variable or control 
variable in the economic development literature. One of the most prominent economic 
measures of state capacity is the ability to raise revenue via taxation (Besley and Persson 
2009; Campbell 1993; Cheibub 1998; Englehart 2005; Fauvelle-Aymar 1999; Levi 1998; 
Lieberman 2002; Tilly 1975). Additional economic interpretations of state capacity 
                                                             
17 Merilee Grindle (1996) defines institutional capacity as the state’s competence in enforcing and 
designing laws that regulate economic and social relationships, as well as the rule of law. Technical 
capacity is the state’s ability to make rational and informed decisions on how best to exercise power. 
Administrative capacity is the state’s ability to organize itself and resources for the public good. Finally 
political capacity is the state’s accountability and responsiveness to the wishes of citizens. 
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include the investment environment (Fearon 2005), or other economic indicators such as 
export profiles, natural resources, and extractive capacity as a proxy (Humphrey, 2005). 
These economic interpretations of state capacity on their own oversimplify the capacities 
necessary for governance. Effective governance requires codified institutions and a 
trained bureaucracy, and thus economic and political operationalizations of state capacity 
should be considered together rather than on their own. 
 More recently, state capacity has been conceptualized as both bureaucratic quality 
(DeRouen and Sobek 2004) and tax capacity (Hendrix 2010). Hendrix (2010) argues that 
state capacity is "professionalism, insulation from political pressure, and efficacy in 
delivering government services (2010, 278)." Yet, Hendrix operationalizes state capacity 
as simply bureaucratic quality, which does not capture the importance of the rule of law 
(Winters 2011), or institutional constraints on bureaucratic power. Some scholars have 
made the concept nearly coterminous with regime type (Vreeland 2008) and democracy, 
arguing that state capacity is indicated by the degree that democratic features are part of 
the political system (Gurr 1974; Hegre et al. 2001; Marshall and Jaggers 2009; Fearon 
and Laitin 2003). Others have made the concept coterminous with a coercive or military 
capacity (Henderson and Singer 2000). Like the economic interpretations of the concept, 
these interpretations oversimplify the vital aspects of effective states. 
 Presently, the concept is a moving target, and the literature assessing what the 
concept is, and what affects it is a far cry from the demands of other literature, such as 
democracy. As a departure from the literature, I assess state capacity as the dependent 
variable and define state capacity as the ability of state officials to translate their disparate 
preferences into policies and services that serve either themselves or their populations. I 
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make this distinction, understanding that some states have a strong state capacity in all 
areas, (e.g. Singapore), but do not necessarily act in favor of their constituents. 
Nonetheless, state capacity is the ability of state entities to translate their preferences into 
choices (i.e. policies). The capacity of states is determined by the strength of 
administrative, institutional, and fiscal capacity. If a state has high administrative 
capacity, it has trained personnel, including technocrats who are efficient in organizing 
themselves and their resources, and can make informed and rational decisions. A state 
with strong institutional capacity has the ability to regulate socioeconomic relationships, 
including designing and enforcing laws, which is contingent upon having established and 
respected institutions. Finally, a state with strong fiscal capacity has the ability to raise 
revenues and allocate those resources as a vehicle for its preferences. 
 A deficit in each of these facets is detrimental for state capacity as a whole. First, 
when administrative capacity is weak, there is the potential for lags in the provision of 
public services, such as transportation and public sanitation. Also, bureaucrats are more 
susceptible to political pressures, and may even succumb to public pressures by taking 
bribes from elites. Second, when institutional capacity is weak, the state has the potential 
to have weak, dependent courts and lack veto powers, which can lend itself to rule by 
law,18 rather than rule of law. Lastly, when fiscal capacity is weak, the state is potentially 
incapable of raising revenues, or maybe effective at raising revenues, but poor at 
allocating funds to serve its preferences absent collusion by powerful actors within and 
outside the state. As a whole, when state capacity is weak, the state can be plagued by 
                                                             
18 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) make a distinction between rule of law and rule by law, by pointing out 
that rule by law is the monopoly over the enforcement of laws wherein elites have the power to 
administer the law as they see fit, while avoiding subjugation to the law (2012: 298-304). 
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rampant corruption that further eats away at the resources of the state and its 
effectiveness. 
 If Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) are right about the significance of 
European settlement (i.e. the percentage of the population of European descent in 1900) 
for institutional quality, a derivative of state capacity, then this relationship should hold 
for the tripartite conceptualization of state capacity put forth here. I therefore hypothesize 
this relationship as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: A higher percentage of European settlement during colonization, 
contributes to higher levels of administrative capacity after independence. 
Hypothesis 2: A higher percentage of European settlement during colonization, 
contributes to higher levels of institutional capacity after independence. 
Hypothesis 3: A higher percentage of European settlement during colonization, 
contributes to higher levels of fiscal capacity after independence. 
The null hypothesis of these claims is that the percentage of European colonial settlers 
has no effect on these three facets of state capacity after independence. 
 In post-colonial states with a higher percentage of European settlers, these three 
facets of state capacity should be strong, because European settlers brought liberal ideals 
and traditions to their colonies. At the height of the colonial enterprise in the 18th 
century, Europe experienced an Age of Enlightenment that shifted their form of 
governance, and the relationship between those that govern and the governed. From this 
age emerged liberal ideas such as legitimacy, liberty, constitutional democracy and rule 
of law, which also contributed to the revolutions that broke out in Western Europe. These 
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new ideals infiltrated the governance practices of European states and America, and 
arguably some of those traditions were transmitted to the colonies through institutions 
during the colonial era. Thus, the three facets of state capacity were affected by the 
diffusion of these ideals to the colonies during the colonial era. This transmission process 
occurred via the provision of tertiary education, training segments of the indigenous 
population in European institutional traditions and offering hands-on experience in the 
administration of the state. Thus, a high percentage of European settlement increased the 
likelihood that this transmission process would occur, which would have lasting effects 
on the capacities of post-colonial states. These societal dimensions of institutional 
transmission are at the core of the broader investigation of colonial inclusivity explored 
empirically in the next chapter. 
3.3 Measuring State Capacity 
 
State capacity is often conceptualized and operationalized using more economic 
terms and variables. As alluded to earlier, the most commonly used measures of state 
capacity in the economic development literature are: total taxes/GDP ratio, total 
revenue/GDP ratio, or logged GDP per capita (Cheibub 1998; Fauvelle-Aymar 1999; 
Levi 1998; Lieberman 2002; Przeworski et al. 2000; Thies 2010; Tilly 1975); the level of 
production and proven past oil production or future reserves (Gereffi, Humphrey, and 
Sturgeon  2005); military expenditures as a percentage of GDP (Henderson and Singer 
2000); and the repudiation of government contracts (Fearon 2005) taken from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) developed  by the Political Risk Services 
Group. These economic measures of state capacity, with the exception of the repudiation 
of government contracts, only capture the extractive capacity of the state. The ability of 
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the state to “get things done” or to translate their preferences into choices requires more 
than just extractive capacity. Institutions and trained personnel are also necessary for 
managing and properly allocating resources once they are acquired. The absence of 
training may contribute to corruption and the loss of state funds.   
On the other hand, the most pervasive non-economic measures of state capacity 
include: the Polity index or Polity2 index (DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Fearon and Laitin 
2003; Gurr 1974; Hegre et al. 2001; Marshall and Jaggers 2009; Vreeland 2008); 
bureaucratic quality from ICRG (Back and Hadenius 2008; DeRouen and Sobek 2004; 
Hendrix 2010) and government effectiveness from the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators.19 The usage of the Polity Index to measure state capacity 
conflates regime type and institutional quality, even though the two are correlated. 
Likewise, bureaucratic quality and government effectiveness only capture the ability of 
the state to manage itself and fails to account for the ability of the state to raise and 
allocate resources effectively, among other factors that are relevant for the interpretation 
of state capacity here. Since the concept is recurring in the economic development and 
broader political science literature, it is important for scholars to find and utilize a 
conceptualization and operationalization of the concept that is comprehensive and 
empirically relevant for disparate contexts. 
I opt for a tripartite operationalization of state capacity, which captures the 
diverse measures of the concept that have thus far been articulated in the literature and 
which is consistent with the conceptualization of state capacity that is proposed here. The 
three facets of state capacity—administrative, institutional, and fiscal—are captured 
                                                             
19 For a more detailed explanation of the various measures of state capacity used in the literature, please 
see the appendix of tables. 
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using four prominent measures of state capacity in the existing literature. Administrative 
capacity is measured using the World Bank’s government effectiveness (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2011) and bureaucratic quality (Howell, 2011), to compare the 
two measures. The first is more holistic in that it captures the quality of the bureaucracy, 
institutional effectiveness, and the quality of public services, whereas the second measure 
only captures bureaucratic quality. Concretely, government effectiveness is an index that: 
[…] captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service, 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to 
such policies. (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2011). 
Government effectiveness is an index ranging from [-2.5, 2.5], with negative values 
indicating poor governance, whereas positive values indicate good governance. The index 
is a composite of scores from various sources, including bureaucratic quality (Howell 
2011). Even though there is some overlap between the two measures of administrative 
capacity employed here, I also use the raw index of bureaucratic quality to eliminate 
some of the “noise” that may be intrinsic to the 16 different sources that government 
effectiveness is derived from. Bureaucratic quality is an index from [0, 4], with the 
highest scores given to countries with bureaucracies that have the expertise and strength 
to govern without interruptions in government services or dramatic changes in policy 
(Howell 2011, 7). 
 Institutional capacity is measured using the political constraints index (Henisz 
2000), which is a measure of the extent to which a change in the preferences of one 
political actor can lead to a change in government policy. This is adopted as a measure of 
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state capacity, because some scholars in the foreign direct investment literature think that 
a state's institutional complexity is indicated by the number of veto players who 
potentially would reduce the ability of individual actors to expropriate state funds (Busse 
and Hefeker 2007; Li 2009; Neumayer and Spess 2005). To capture this logic, the 
political constraints index is a measure of veto players and the feasibility of policy 
change in 234 countries from 1800-present, with values ranging from [0, 1]. These values 
can be interpreted as “[when] the number of actors with independent veto power 
increases, the level of political constraints increases” (Henisz 2005, 3). Finally, fiscal 
capacity is measured using each observation’s tax revenue as a percentage of GDP 
(World Bank 2016). The numeric values of this variable are the tax revenue percentage of 
the GDP for each country, from [0,100]. For example, Malaysia’s tax revenue collected 
by the central government in 2010 was 14.3% of the GDP, whereas Indonesia’s tax 
revenue collected by the central government in 2010 was 10.9% of the GDP. 
 Additionally, I evaluate the extent to which these measures are in fact separate 
measures of state capacity. The correlation between World Bank government 
effectiveness and ICRG bureaucratic quality is high at (0.91), which is expected given 
that the index for both variables is coded similarly, and because bureaucratic quality is 
one of the factors included in the government effectiveness indicator. The correlations 
between the political constraints index and government effectiveness and bureaucratic 
quality are high as well at (0.65) and (0.61) respectively. The correlations between tax as 
a percentage of GDP and the other variables are fairly low at 0.35 for government 
effectiveness, 0.35 for bureaucratic quality, and 0.21 for the political constraints index. 
While the correlation between government effectiveness and bureaucratic quality is high, 
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I still believe that it is important to handle these separately and compare the effect of 
European settlement during colonialism on these alternative measures that are 
prominently used in the literature on state capacity and economic development. 
3.4 European Colonial Settlement and State Capacity 
 
 In order to test the relationship between colonialism, operationalized as the level 
of European settlement, I first utilize data from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) 
to replicate Table III from their analysis, which contains several estimates of the 
determinants of institutions. In Tables I-II, I replicate the most relevant aspects of their 
assessment for this study using regression analysis on two operationalizations of 
institutional quality (i.e. average protection against expropriation risk and constraint on 
the executive).20 In model 7 and 8 of Table I, I replicate Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson's (2001) analysis of the relationship between European settlement in 1900 and 
average protection against expropriation risk in 1985-1995 and find a positive and 
significant relationship when latitude is excluded from the model (3.18, p<0.01), and 
when latitude is included in the model (3.00, p<0.01). In models 1 and 2, I also replicate 
their assessment of constraints on the executive in 1900 and average protection against 
expropriation risk and find a positive and significant relationship (0.32, p<0.01). This 
effect remains even when assessing constraint on the executive one year after 
independence (0.24, p<0.01), which suggests that the institutional complexity of the 
colonial regime was eradicated by independence. 
[Table 1 about here] 
                                                             
20 Descriptions of all of the variables included in this analysis can be found in the Appendix A table, which 
is derived from Appendix Table 1 of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) on p. 1397. 
59 
 
This intuition is supported by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson's (2001) test of 
the aforementioned relationships on constraint on the executive in 1900. In Table II, I 
replicate AJR's (2001) findings on the extent that European settlement and log settler 
mortality affects the constraint on the executive in 1900. In model 2, I find that a higher 
percentage of European settlers in 1900 has a strong and positive relationship with 
constraint on the executive in 1900 (0.05, p<0.01), such that a 1 percent increase in the 
number of European settlers, increases the constraint on the executive by 0.05. Given that 
the constraint on the executive in 1900 is on a scale from [1, 7], an increase of 0.05 is 
substantial. Alternatively, log settler mortality has a negative and significant relationship 
with constraint on the executive in 1900 (-0.51, p<0.01), which suggests that a decrease 
in the level of settlement as a result of high mortality is detrimental to the constraints on 
the executive at the turn of the twentieth century, a key feature of institutional capacity. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Using AJR’s (2001) analysis as a point of reference, I utilize Fails and 
Krieckhaus’ (2010) level of European settlement indicator to estimate the effect of the 
percentage of European settlement on the three categories of state capacity. Beginning 
with Table III, I estimate the relationship between the tripartite measure of state 
capacity—administrative, institutional, and fiscal capacity—and the level of European 
settlement in 2010 in separate models. I measure administrative capacity as World Bank 
government effectiveness and ICRG bureaucratic quality. Institutional capacity is 
operationalized as the political constraints index, while fiscal capacity is operationalized 
as World Bank tax revenue to GDP ratio.  
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In model 1 and 2, I find a significant and positive relationship (p<0.01) between 
the level of European settlement and administrative capacity, with both government 
effectiveness (2.33, p<0.01) and bureaucratic quality (0.56, p<0.01) increasing as the 
level of European settlement increases. Similarly, in model 3 I find a positive and 
significant relationship between institutional capacity and the level of European 
settlement, with the effect on the political constraints index being (0.47, p<0.01). I also 
find a positive and significant relationship between level of settlement and fiscal capacity 
operationalized as the tax ratio (5.43, p<0.10). These results provide strong evidence for 
hypothesis 1 and 2 that higher levels of European settlement increase administrative and 
institutional capacity and confirms the AJR (2001) argument that the level of European 
settlement matters for institutional quality. Furthermore, the significance of each 
operationalization confirms the complexity of state capacity and provides credence to the 
tripartite definition employed here, while at the same time uncovering the relevance of 
examining colonialism’s effects on different facets of state capacity. 
Notably, the level of settlement seems to have its biggest effect on administrative 
capacity, with government effectiveness increasing by 2.32 with a higher percentage of 
European settlers. This is striking, because government effectiveness is on a scale from [-
2.5, 2.5], with positive values equating to higher government effectiveness. However, this 
effect is also strong for the other indicators. For instance, bureaucratic quality is on a 
scale from [0, 4], which means that an increase in the quality of the bureaucracy by 0.56 
is substantial. Likewise, the variable for institutional capacity is a on a scale from [0, 1], 
which means that an increase in political constraints by 0.47 is also a substantive effect. 
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Interestingly there is a significant, but not as pronounced relationship between the level 
of settlement and fiscal capacity. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 In Table IV, I estimate the effect of log settler mortality on the tripartite measure 
of state capacity. In their analysis, AJR (2001) explored the possibility that the 
percentage of European settlers may create some endogeneity issues, because these 
percentages might be influenced by political conditions in the colonies. They proxy 
settler mortality as a truly exogenous measure, even though one could argue that settler 
mortality can also be influenced by political conditions and not just environmental issues. 
I also utilize this as an alternative measure of colonialism in the models depicted on 
Table IV. As expected, I find a negative and significant relationship (p<0.01) between log 
settler mortality and all four operationalizations of state capacity. It appears that log 
settler mortality may have a larger negative effect on fiscal capacity, than the positive 
effect of level of European settlement on fiscal capacity. 
[Table 4 about here] 
3.5 Robustness Checks 
 
Concerning the OLS assumptions, I will now discuss the tests of these 
assumptions for the models in Table III. For each of the models, I found that the errors 
are homoscedastic and therefore do not require correction.  
There are, however, some outliers in the model such that I tested for leverage. I 
found that the highest leverage states are Argentina, United States, New Zealand, 
Australia, and Canada (graphically depicted by Figure 1). This can be expected given the 
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fact that these were colonies with high concentrations of European settlement, with a 
smaller indigenous populations and minimal pre-existing structures that would make a 
“blank slate'' of state formation difficult.21 In order to correct for leverage, I re-estimated 
the models using robust regression, which is sensitive to outliers and high leverage 
points. A robust regression, which uses Huber weight functions, minimizes the high 
residuals of outliers and high leverage observations. It is 95% as efficient as OLS (Huber 
1981).  
Table V depicts the outcome of the robust regression estimate of the models from 
Table III. The results of this analysis are quite similar, except for the effect of level of 
European settlement on fiscal capacity (6.23, p<0.05), which suggests that the outliers 
dampened the effect of settlement on the fiscal capacity of states. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
[Table 5 about here] 
3.6 Summary 
 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) had a strong influence on the economic 
development literature, particularly as it relates to the legacy of colonialism for the long-
term economic growth of post-colonial states. A key feature of their causal narrative—
colonial extraction precipitates institutional quality, which precipitates long term 
economic growth—has yet to be fully explored. As an extension of their argument, I have 
explored how European settlement affects a prominent explanatory variable, state 
capacity, in and outside the economic development literature. This exploration is 
                                                             
21 Granted, the pre-existing populations that existed were exterminated by European settlers, such as the 
annihilation of Native Americans in the future United States and aborigines in Australia.  
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important, because political scientists have not come to a general consensus about what 
state capacity is, nor have we empirically assessed what contributes to weak and strong 
state capacity. This is especially important for post-colonial states that are often plagued 
by slow economic growth, and in some instances inefficient and ineffective governments, 
which contribute to a whole slew of other issues that affect their populations. 
The results of this analysis suggest that when the relationship between the level of 
settlement and measures of contemporary state capacity are analyzed, there is still a 
strong and positive effect on administrative capacity and institutional capacity. This 
relationship is not as strong for fiscal capacity (tax revenue as a percentage of GDP). This 
supports my hypotheses and suggests that the level of settlement matters for post-colonial 
state capacity. Lastly, in order to adequately operationalize this complex concept, it is 
important for scholars to disaggregate using prominent indicators that are already in use 
in the literature, in order to capture the multidimensional aspects of state capacity. 
In the future, more research will need to be done to assess the causal mechanisms 
that connect level of settlement and the colonial enterprise with post-independence 
governance. In the next chapter, I delve further into the connection between efforts to 
transmit liberal, Weberian institutions to society via human capital-creating institutions.  
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3.7 Tables and Figures 
Table 3.1: AJR(2001) Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk in 1985-1995 
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Table 3.2: AJR(2001) Constraint on Executive in 1900 
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Table 3.3: Measures of State Capacity in 2010 and Level of European Settlement (1900) 
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Table 3.4: Measures of State Capacity in 2010 and Settler Mortality 
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Table 3.5: Measures of State Capacity in 2010 with Huber Weights 
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Figure 3.1 0-1: Level of European Settlement and Government Effectiveness 
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Appendix: Variable Descriptions 
 
Figure 3.2: Variable Descriptions 
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Chapter IV: COLONIAL EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
AND CONTEMPORARY OUTPUTS IN STATE CAPACITY 
 
To date, the political economy literature has assessed how the level of European 
settlement influenced institutional quality in the colonies and contributed to divergent 
outcomes in economic development. There is considerable evidence that higher levels of 
European settlement had an overall positive effect on economic development through the 
transmission of institutions and property rights. While these studies have uncovered the 
importance of European settlement for transmitting liberal institutional traditions at the 
macro-level, what is missing in analyses of colonial legacy analyses is an explicit 
examination of an additional mechanism that may also account for the transmission of 
these institutions to the colonized population. another mechanism—education.  
At the core of state building is the near necessity of a synergy between ‘the state’ 
and ‘society’, in which civil society has the ability to constrain state capabilities or 
legitimize and reinforce the state’s authority (Migdal 1988). Central to this study is the 
argument that education serves as a vehicle for socializing the population into adopting 
norms and laws created by the state, education contributes to state building by 
encouraging the population to enter the bureaucracy. The inclusion of the colonized 
population in human capital creating institutions aids the transmission of liberal 
institutions, and ultimately contributes to the effect of colonial legacy on contemporary 
state capacity. In this chapter, I analyze the effect of colonial education policies as 
leading to institutions that built human capital and thereby shaped colonized populations’ 
ability to govern after independence. I empirically assess the relationship between 
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educational attainment levels in 1900 and the 2010 levels of state capacity for former 
colonies.  
I find that even when controlling for the level of European settlement, and the 
expanse of the state both prior to and during the colonial enterprise, the level of 
educational attainment has an independent effect on contemporary state capacity. In the 
first section of this chapter, I revisit the theory behind colonial inclusivity, and present the 
hypothesis to be tested. In the second half of this chapter, I provide an explanation of the 
indicators employed here, and enter an empirical investigation of the effects of colonial 
educational attainment levels on three prominent indicators of state capacity in the 
political economy literature. In the final section of this paper, I conclude with a 
discussion of the results. 
4.1 The Argument 
 
My core argument is that education and the development of human capital is 
instrumental to state building. Education is one of several mechanisms for state building, 
a point I return to in the conclusion. There are a lot of ways to build a state; education is 
one of these and it is this mechanism that I explore here. Additionally, for simplicity I 
assume that education is a homogenous practice, without getting into the particulars of 
the variation in educational policy across space within a territory. 
Education serves as the vehicle for incorporating the colonized population into the 
state, and preparing them to enter the meritocratic, Weberian bureaucracy (Evans and 
Rauch 1999). These inclusive policies were most likely to occur when the colonizing 
state had a liberal domestic paradigm. By the turn of the 20th century, much of Western 
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Europe had adopted constitutional liberalism at the behest of British hegemony (Parry 
2006). This adoption of liberalism began to surface in their policy making and perceived 
moral obligation towards their colonial ‘countrymen’. By the middle of the 19th century, 
many of the European colonial powers began investing in the colonized population, such 
as the French in Benin (Wantchekon, Klasnja, and Novta 2014), the British in India and 
Malaya (Whitehead 1981), and the Dutch in the East Indies (Penders 1968). This 
coincided with their desire for territorial and operational expansion. Granted, this varied, 
and this shift did not occur for all colonial territories.22 Nevertheless, in contexts where 
this shift did occur, this investment in the human capital of subjugated populations was 
important for their ability to serve in the central bureaucracy and engage in the non-
agricultural sector. 
European investment in human capital for the colonized population had long-term 
ramifications for the development and state building capabilities of the population post-
independence. Although the colonial enterprise was characteristically corrosive of pre-
existing structures, including those that were central to human development (Banerjee & 
Prasad 2008) served as a means of developing the colonized population in the presence of 
otherwise extractive foreign occupiers. The corollary is that not providing colonial 
populations with adequate education more than likely meant their exclusion from the 
central bureaucracy, which contributed to ineffective institutional transmission and 
stagnation post-independence. 
                                                             
22 Many of the European colonial powers did not view colonial populations equally. Territories that 
experienced educational expansion was driven by European racial perceptions. Colonies in Asia and the 
Americas—barring much of the Caribbean—experienced educational expansion, while much of Africa was 
left untouched by the sudden ideological shifts in Europe. 
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The percentage of the colonized population that was given access to education 
and subsequent educational attainment levels contributed to either nurturing or harming 
institutional diffusion post-independence. The skills necessary to either maintain or 
develop effective institutions requires skilled labor and an educated class (Glaeser et al. 
2004; Green 1990; 2013; Lipset 1959). This is supported by Green (1990), who argues 
that skilled labor that stems from higher levels of human capital (i.e. educational 
attainment levels) within a population is essential for effective state building. In the 
context of colonialism and liberal institutional transmission, granting access to education 
was crucial to the survival and the quality of the survival of colonial institutions. During 
and after independence, higher educational attainment amongst the non-European 
population had ramifications for the quality of the bureaucracy and strength of the non-
agricultural sector. This line of reasoning is also supported by the analysis of Glaeser et 
al. (2004), who find that human capital measured as total years of schooling is a better 
explanation of economic growth than prominent measures of institutions. Like Glaeser et 
al. (2004), I shift my attention away from a state institution explanation of development 
to an education based explanation of state development.23  
This argument suggests that the expansion and extension of education to non-
European populations at all levels influenced the quality of the bureaucracy and 
subsequently contemporary outputs in state capacity. I will assess the effect of colonial 
educational attainment using the following: 
                                                             
23 Note, the explanation put forth here does not assume that absent the colonial enterprise these 
societies would not have advanced, but rather that colonialism was so disruptive to pre-existing 
sociopolitical orders that it left a legacy on the fragmented societal and political structures in its wake.  
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Hypothesis: All else being equal, higher levels of educational attainment among 
the colonized population contribute to higher levels of contemporary state 
capacity. 
4.2.1 Government Effectiveness 
 
To assess the effect of colonial educational attainment on state capacity and to 
capture its multifaceted nature, I opt to operationalize state capacity in three different 
ways. These three ways of operationalizing the concept are informed by commonly used 
variables across the literature. First, I capture what is commonly employed in the public 
administration literature as administrative capacity, which is the ability of the state to 
legislate and implement policy without intrusion from an external entity. This is 
measured by utilizing the World Bank’s government effectiveness (Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 2011). This measure of state capacity is holistic, in that it captures the quality 
of the bureaucracy, institutional effectiveness, and the quality of public services. 
Explicitly from its progenitors, government effectiveness is an index that: 
[…] captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service, and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies. (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011). 
The government effectiveness index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with negative values 
indicating poor governance, whereas positive values indicate good governance. The index 
is a composite of scores from various sources, including the bureaucratic quality indicator 
that I assess separately (PRS Group 2016).  
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4.2.2 Bureaucratic Quality 
 
The second measure of state capacity that I employ is bureaucratic quality (PRS 
Group 2016), which is an index on a scale from 0 to 4, with high scores given to 
countries with bureaucracies that have the expertise and strength to govern without 
interruptions in government services or dramatic changes in policy (Howell 2011, 7). 
Even though there is some overlap between the two measures of administrative capacity 
employed here (e.g. World Bank government effectiveness and ICRG bureaucratic 
quality), these two indices have been used differently in the literature. Bureaucratic 
quality is prominent in the good governance, economic development, foreign aid, and 
conflict literature (Chong and Calderon 2000; Hendrix 2010; Knack 1999; Knack and 
Rahman 2007; Lambsdorff 2003; La Porta, Lopez de Silane, Shleifer, and Vishny 1996; 
Rauch and Evans 2000; Selaya and Thiele 2012; Van de Walle 2005), while government 
effectiveness is predominantly used in the literatures on governance, economic 
development and the comparative politics literature on democracy (Guisan 2009; 
Globerman and Shapiro 2002; 2003; Kapoor and Ravi 2012; Knack 2002; Lee and 
Whitford 2009; Magalhães 2014). This warrants assessing both for added robustness.  
4.2.3 Tax Ratio 
 
Lastly, the literature has operationalized state capacity as the fiscal capacity of the 
state. I utilize the World Bank’s tax ratio, which is the tax revenue as a percentage of 
GDP (World Bank 2016), utilized by Thies (2010). The values for this variable are a 
percentage of the GDP for each country, from [0,100]. For example, the total tax revenue 
collected by Malaysia’s central government in 2010 was 14.3% of their GDP, whereas 
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the total tax revenue collected by Indonesia’s central government in 2010 was 10.9% of 
their GDP. 
4.2.4 Colonial Educational Attainment 
 
I measure level of colonial educational attainment as an estimation of the total 
years of schooling of the population aged 15-64 (Lee and Lee 2016). Lee and Lee (2016) 
create the total years of schooling indicator from school enrollment estimates derived 
from various sources, such as the League of Nations’ efforts to collect country statistics, 
UNESCO, and a host of compendia (Benavot and Riddle 1988; Mitchell 2003a, b, c; 
Lindert 2004; Banks and Wilson 2013).  Total years of schooling is comprised of data 
from 1870-1920, and historical enrollment ratios from 1820-1945. Lee and Lee (2016) 
combine this information with census data24 from a later period that has information on 
educational attainment by age (Lee and Lee 2016, 160). Additionally, Lee and Lee (2016) 
use backwards extrapolation from census data in 1950 to estimate pre-1950 educational 
attainment levels.25  
Following much of the colonialism literature (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2001; Banerjee and Iyer 2005; Feyrer and Sacerdote 2009; Sokoloff and 
Engerman 2000), the dataset is cross-sectional; educational attainment observations are 
from 1900. The data is somewhat arbitrary, but it lies within the height of imperialism 
(1800-1914) and maximizes data availability, including a sample of 56 former colonies, 
                                                             
24UNESCO’s Statistical Yearbook (various years) contains the actual enrollment ratios.  
25 Naturally, backwards extrapolation is not the most ideal coding scheme for this indicator. In order to 
ascertain that the 1900 statistics are unique from the 1950 level data, I correlated total years of schooling 
in 1900 and 1950 and found that they are statistically distinct.  Currently, this indicator is the best-known 
recent estimate of historical educational attainment levels, which has been cited by 39 published articles 
since its publication but has yet to be utilized in political science research.  
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of various colonial origins and administrative traditions (e.g. British, French, Dutch, 
Spanish, Belgian, and Portuguese). Also, the selection of the year 1900 is motivated by 
the fact that this date precedes the extensive expansion of education to the colonized 
population, in response to economic conditions and the World Wars in Europe. I provide 
further justification for the selection of 1900 in Chapter V. Table 1 contains all the 
explanatory variables and the dependent variable, their data sources, and their descriptive 
statistics.  
[Table 1 about here] 
4.2.5 Control Variables 
 
I control for possible alternative explanations such as the level of European 
settlement, pre-colonial and colonial statehood, colonial identity (e.g. British or French), 
and logged GDP per capita. The level of European settlement is derived from Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2001), who operationalize the level of European settlement as 
the “fraction of the population of European descent in 1900”. This data is extracted using 
the statistics from McEvedy and Jones (1975) and Curtin et al. (1995).  
In order to control for the possibility that the extent of the colonial state may have 
an effect on colonial education attainment levels, I utilize the level of statehood which is 
an estimation of early state capacity derived from the State Antiquity Index (version 3) 
created by Bockstette and Putterman (2007). 26 Potentially, early statehood limited the 
                                                             
26 The index is creates using the borders of current countries to identify observations, and comprised of 
scores for each 39 half centuries from year 1 to 1950 by answering three questions. “a) Is there a 
government above the tribal/chiefdom level? (1 if yes, 0.75 if chiefdom, 0 if tribe); b) Is the government 
locally based? (1 if yes, 0.75 if there is a local government with substantial foreign oversight, 0.5 if foreign 
based); c) How much of the present-day country’s territory was ruled by the historical government? (1 if 
more than 50%; 0.75 if between 25% and 50%, 0.5 if between 10% and 25%, 0.3 if less than 10%) (Hariri 
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options available to settlers upon their arrival. Pre-colonial societies that had more 
extensive states were more limiting to settlers. I utilize estimates for the 1451-1500 half 
century to create an indicator for statehood in 1500 (e.g. pre-colonial statehood), 
henceforth called state capacity in 1500. One could argue that pre-colonial state capacity 
has more of an influence on the contemporary indicators of state capacity than education. 
Thus, I control for that here, and explore it more directly in an extension of this analysis. 
I also use estimates for the 1801-1850 half century to create an indicator for statehood in 
1850 (colonial state capacity). Higher values of statehood indicate that the historical state 
had a significant government beyond a chiefdom or tribe, was locally based with little to 
no foreign oversight, and held a substantial portion of the territory ruled by the 
government.  
Additionally, I assess the extent to which the identity of the colonial power 
matters for the state capacity of former colonies. I measure this using dummy variables 
for the British colonial identity, which measures whether or not an observation is a 
British colony, with “1” being yes  and “0” being no. I do not explicitly control for 
colonies that were colonized by the Spanish, Portuguese, or Dutch, given that the main 
argument for why this matters emphasized the differences between the British and French 
(La Porta et al. 1998, 1999). Thus, this is a fixed effects model of colonial identity. 
Finally, there may be a link between economic development and geographic location, and 
the capacity of the state. I control for this using logged GDP per capita from the World 
Bank estimates for 2010, and the United Nations Statistics Division (2013).  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2012, 475).” The scores from each of the questions is multiplied for the each ½ century and the final score 
for the index is computed as a summation of the discounted value of the scores for the 39 half centuries. 
For more information, see Bockstette and Putterman (2007). 
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4.3 Preliminary Analysis 
 
 I begin my empirical investigation by examining the relationship between 
education attainment levels and government effectiveness. As a preliminary assessment, I 
explore the correlation between educational attainment in 1900 and state capacity in 
2010, which is depicted in Table 2. The correlation between educational attainment and 
government effectiveness is (0.74/1.00), providing preliminary evidence in support of my 
hypothesis. Figure 1 demonstrates visually the correlation between these two indicators, 
confirming that educational attainment is associated with subsequent state capacity. 
[Table 2 about here] 
[Figure 1 about here] 
4.4 Outliers: Neo-Europes 
 
Crosby (1986) and Fails and Krieckhaus (2010) argue that Neo-Europes (i.e. U.S., 
Canada, New Zealand, and Australia) are different than other colonies because there was 
a high level of European settlement due to the eradication of the pre-existing societies 
and populations in those territories. As a result, this created a blank slate for state 
building. In these colonies, education levels were much higher. The inclusion of these 
countries in the sample could affect the estimates in both the correlation of these two 
indicators, and the regression analysis in the next section. It is therefore important to 
ensure that the results are not driven by these outliers. Figure 2 demonstrates that if 
anything, the relationship holds even more strongly outside of the Neo-Europes.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
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Table 4 includes estimates of the effect of colonial educational attainment on 
contemporary state capacity, including the Neo-Europes. Neo-Europes are excluded from 
Tables 5-8; unlike the Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) story in which the 
positive results disappear once the Neo-Europes are excluded from the model (Fails and 
Krieckhaus 2010), the results here remain strong even after they are excluded. The 
appendix contains tables with the same models from Tables 5-7, including the Neo-
Europes for comparison. As seen there, the effect of education is clear regardless of 
whether one includes or excludes the Neo-Europes. Given that the results without outliers 
are more conservative, I exclude those in the primary tables.   
4.5 Does Colonial Education Attainment Merely Reflect Prior State 
Capacity?  
 
Before moving into the results section, it is important to address a classic problem 
in political science empirical assessments, which is the potential for reverse causation 
(Przeworski 2004; 2009). My core argument is that colonial education policies are a 
predictor of contemporary state capacity in former colonies. A potential problem is that 
state capacity before or during the colonial period may explain colonial education policy, 
and thus education is a consequence of state capacity rather than a cause. This reverse 
causality objection stems from the possibility that early statehood or state capacity 
determined what options were available to colonists. A strong pre-existing state apparatus 
might lead to robust educational policies.  
In point of fact, empirically the relationship between pre-colonial state capacity 
and educational attainment indicates the opposite of this claim. This finding is supported 
by the preliminary empirical evidence provided by Table 3, which contains model 1-4. I 
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assess the effect of pre-colonial and colonial state capacity—using the best data available 
on early state capacity27—on educational attainment in 1900 and on the World Bank’s 
government effectiveness indicator, independently. Contrary to the notion that effective 
states had high educational attainment, thereby leading to even more effective states, in 
point of fact it was the less effective states that had more educational attainment.  
[Table 3 about here] 
4.6 OLS Results 
 
I begin the main section of this empirical assessment with strong evidence in 
support of my hypothesis. The results reported here suggest that colonial education 
policies that contributed to higher levels of educational attainment had a positive 
influence on the first measure of state capacity—the level of government effectiveness. In 
model 5 of Table 4, I estimate the influence of educational attainment levels, controlling 
only for level of European settlement. A key aspect of the political economy narrative 
emphasizes the influence of European settlement on institutional development. Yet, 
educational attainment levels are statistically significant and robust to the inclusion of 
this prominent indicator in the literature.  
[Table 4 about here] 
I argued above that state capacity is not a product of the pre-historical state, and in 
models 6-7 on Table 4, I explore pre-colonial state capacity (in 1500) and colonial state 
capacity (in 1850). Model 6 includes state capacity in 1500; while educational attainment 
remains significant and the coefficient is relatively unchanged (0.34, p<0.01), the 
                                                             
27 I explain this operationalization of early state capacity in greater detail in the empirical section of this 
assessment. 
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coefficient for level of European settlement increases along with its significance level 
(1.11, p<0.05). State capacity in 1500, however, does not appear to have an independent 
effect on contemporary government effectiveness.  
Since the same reverse causation argument could apply to colonial state capacity 
circa 1850, in model 7, I estimate the strength of this relationship and find that there is an 
effect of colonial state capacity on government effectiveness, albeit at the 90th percentile 
(p<0.10), with an increase in colonial statehood contributing to a decrease in government 
effectiveness of 0.01. This can be explained by the goals of these regimes, which were 
largely to extract as much as possible. Educational attainment levels still matter at a 
lower significance level, as does level of European settlement (1.4, p<0.05). A plot of the 
relationship between government effectiveness and educational attainment is provided 
below, which also graphically depicts where each country falls on the line.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
In the next set of models (8-10) in Table 5, I assess the relationship between 
government effectiveness and educational attainment levels in former colonies, excluding 
the Neo-Europes (United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand).28 In model 8, I 
find that educational attainment levels seem to have a more pronounced effect on 
government effectiveness, with an increase in total years of schooling contributing to an 
increase in government effectiveness of 0.58 (p<0.01). In this estimation, once the Neo-
Europes are excluded from the model, the level of European settlement no longer matters. 
Prior to this analysis it would seem that high levels of European settlement would have 
                                                             
28 See the discussion on page 16 about the difference between the Neo-Europes and the rest of the 
former colonies, as articulated by Fails and Krieckhaus (2010). 
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long term ramifications for government effectiveness. However, colonies without large 
settlements akin to the Neo-Europes did not experience the same level of effect. This also 
provides evidence that the results in Table 4 are not driven by countries with high 
European settlement. In model 9 and 10, educational attainment levels in 1900 remain 
significant, even after including state capacity in 1500 (0.008, p<0.10) and 1850.  
[Table 5 about here] 
 Now, I turn my attention to the influence of educational attainment on my second 
measure of state capacity—bureaucratic quality. In Table 6, models 11-13, I find that 
educational attainment levels in 1900 influences bureaucratic quality in 2010, with 
varying levels of significance, and with level of European settlement remaining 
insignificant across the four models in Table 6. In model 11, an increase in colonial 
educational attainment levels leads to a 0.17 increase in bureaucratic quality (p<0.05). 
Similarly, in model 12, an increase in educational attainment levels leads to an increase in 
bureaucratic quality. Distinct from the government effectiveness models, there is a 
significant relationship between pre-colonial state capacity in 1500 (0.005, p<0.01) and 
bureaucratic quality, as one would expect. In model 13, the effect of educational 
attainment in 1900 remains, while state capacity in 1850 is statistically insignificant for 
bureaucratic quality.  In sum, these results suggest that, like government effectiveness, 
the relationship between educational attainment levels during colonialism has a 
significant influence on post-colonial governance, when examining two prominent 
indicators for measuring state capacity. 
[Table 6 about here] 
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 On table 7, I turn my attention to assessing the sensitivity of my third measure of 
state capacity—the tax ratio (fiscal capacity) in former colonies—to colonial levels of 
educational attainment. Across model 14-16, I find that educational attainment levels 
matter for the fiscal capacity of former colonies, even when controlling for pre- and 
colonial state capacity, as well as level of European settlement. In model 14 and 15, the 
level of educational attainment for any given colony increases the tax ratio by 4.9 
(p<0.05) and 4.62 (p<0.05) respectively. This is a significant increase given that the 
minimum and maximum values for the tax ratio is 7.83 and 34.40. In model 16, the effect 
of the level of educational attainment on the tax ratio is slightly smaller. State capacity in 
1850 is also significant in the expected direction. This is expected because a large 
colonial state may lead to an extractive state in the worse way, which could contribute to 
effective predatory states after independence.  
[Table 7 about here] 
4.7 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
A prominent alternative explanation in the literature regarding colonial legacy and 
development relates to the difference created by colonial identity. For some scholars, the 
British were unique in their creation of complex bureaucratic institutions in their 
colonies, even though all colonies had institutions of some kind or other. In order to 
assess the robustness of the explanation explored here to the influence of colonial 
identity, I estimate the relationship between the level of educational attainment on all 
measures of state capacity, controlling for British colonialism. In models 17-19 in Table 
8, I examine this relationship while also controlling for colonial identity (i.e. British or 
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not British). In model 17, I find evidence that colonial educational attainment remains 
significant for post-colonial fiscal capacity (tax ratio), controlling for level of European 
settlement, statehood in 1500, and British colonialism. In model 18, I find that 
educational attainment has a significant influence on government effectiveness, while the 
level of European settlement, state capacity in 1500, and British colonialism does as well. 
In model 19, I assess the influence of colonial educational attainment levels on 
bureaucratic quality, and find evidence that it is robust, even with the inclusion of British 
colonialism. These results affirm the importance of educational attainment for the 
bureaucracy, as well as provides further evidence for past studies that argue that the level 
of settlement and British colonialism matter for bureaucratic quality. What is interesting 
is that British colonialism in and of itself does not have an independent effect on tax as a 
percentage of GDP (fiscal capacity), even though scholars have previously argued that 
British colonialism was especially good for post-colonial economies writ large.    
     [Table 8 about here] 
 Finally, scholars often contemplate the relevance of geographic location for 
economic development (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1999; Krugman 1997; Rodrik, 
Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004). Potentially, geographic location (Coppedge et al. 2015: 
267) and economic development proxied by logged GDP per capita are an alternative 
explanation for contemporary state capacity. These two indicators have been empirically 
controlled for in previous colonial studies. I assess the influence of colonial educational 
attainment on contemporary state capacity, while controlling for the geographic location 
and logged GDP per capita of the countries in the sample. I find that educational 
attainment in 1900 still remains significant for contemporary state capacity, even when 
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geography is included in the model. Geography has no effect on contemporary levels of 
state capacity, while logged GDP per capita has an expected relationship with 
contemporary capacity. Even though logged GDP per capita has an effect on 
contemporary state capacity (p<0.01), educational attainment levels in 1900 remains 
impervious to its inclusion in model 22. 
[Table 9 about here] 
4.8 Is 1900 merely 1950? 
 
A fair critique of this analysis is that educational attainment in 1950, after 
independence, is most relevant for contemporary state capacity in all forms. Along with 
this critique, there is also a counter-argument that educational attainment levels in 1950 
are the same as 1900, and thus drawing a conclusion from educational attainment levels 
from over 100 years ago is inappropriate. Arguably, educational attainment levels in 1950 
were predicated on educational attainments levels at the turn of the twentieth century, at 
the height of the colonial era. We can infer from the correlation in Table 10 that 
education policies in former colonies were path dependent, and that decisions made by 
colonists affected post-colonial education policy decisions. Moreover, post-colonial 
education policy decisions as a product of colonial education policies affected education 
policy decisions going into the 21st century. Correlating educational attainment levels in 
1900 and 1950, we get the following results in an OLS estimation: 
[Table 10 about here] 
The model in Table 10, with educational attainment in 1900 regressed on educational 
attainment in 1950, demonstrates that educational attainment in 1900 is a strong predictor 
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of educational attainment levels in the middle of the twentieth century, which is post-
independence for a large percentage of countries in the sample of 60 former colonies. 
This is further demonstrated by the scatterplot below which suggests that there is a 
relationship and that there is some variation between the two timepoints.  
[Figure III about here ] 
4.9 Summary 
 
In the research on the significance of colonialism for contemporary outputs in 
economic development, much of the emphasis has been placed on the importance of the 
level of European settlement for development or economic stagnation. In this chapter, I 
delve deeper into colonial inclusivity by focusing on colonial education and its effect on 
state capacity across former colonies. This particular chapter is distinct from the rest of 
the literature in its focus on colonial education policy outputs (educational attainment 
levels) and their legacy and impact for contemporary state capacity. 
Here, I assessed the relationship between levels of educational attainment in 1900 
and contemporary state capacity for 56 former colonies in 2010. I examined this 
relationship in terms of three prominent indicators of state capacity—government 
effectiveness, bureaucratic quality, and tax ratio. I find that colonies’ education 
attainment levels at the turn of the 20th century are still relevant for explaining variation 
in their state capacity in 2010. Moreover, these results are not the artifacts of pre-colonial 
history; this finding still holds when controlling for levels of settlement, pre-colonial and 
colonial state capacity, geographic location, and GDP per capita as a measure of 
economic development. Decisions during the colonial era regarding the education 
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apparatus, which is key to developing the human capital of a population, had long term 
ramifications for state capacity. 
 This chapter moves us closer to understanding which factors are important for 
state capacity in the long run by shifting state capacity from being an explanatory 
variable to a dependent variable. The results of this chapter have implications for more 
than just the determinants of state capacity, but also speak to the literature on human 
capital and institutional development. Moreover, this study provides evidence for the 
importance of education in and of itself for institutional development and maintenance.  
4.10 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Variable Type Min Max Source 
State Capacity Dependent 
Variable 
-1.65 
0 
7.83 
2.25 
1 
34.30 
 
WB Government 
Effectiveness;  
ICRG Bureaucratic 
Quality;  
World Bank Tax 
Ratio 
Educational 
Attainment 
Independent 
Variable 
0.005 5.7 Total Years of 
Schooling in 1900 
of Population aged 
15-64 (Lee and Lee 
2016) 
Economic 
Development 
Control 
Variable 
6.25 10.05 World Bank Logged 
GDP Per Capita  
Level of 
European 
Settlement 
Control 
Variable 
0 0.6 Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson 
(2001)  
Statehood in 
1500; 
Statehood in 
1850 
Control 
Variable 
0 
0 
50 
50 
Bockstette and 
Putterman (2007) 
Educational 
Attainment in 
1950 
Control 
Variable 
0.024 8.84 Total Years of 
Schooling (Barro 
and Lee 2013) 
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Table 4.2: Correlations 
Variables Correlation 
Government Effectiveness 
and Educational Attainment 
0.74/1.00 (0.55/1.00) 
   
*Note the number in parenthesis is the correlation squared. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Two-way scatterplot of Total Years of Schooling (ages 15-64) and World Bank 
Government Effectiveness 
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Figure 4.2: Two-way scatterplot of Total Years of Schooling (ages 15-64) and World Bank 
Government Effectiveness (w/o U.S., Canada, New Zealand, and Australia) 
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Table 4.3: Historical State Capacity and Colonial Education Policy 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  
VARIABLES Educational 
Attainment 
In 1900 
World Bank 
Government 
Effectiveness 
In 2010 
World Bank 
Government 
Effectiveness 
In 2010 
Educational 
Attainment 
In 1900 
     
State Capacity in 
1500 
-0.0115*** 
(0.004) 
-0.00220 
(0.006) 
  
  
 
  
State Capacity in 
1850 
  -0.00132 
(0.007) 
0.00631 
(0.005) 
   
  
Constant 0.697*** -0.289** -0.285 0.237 
 (0.103) (0.140) (0.273) (0.209) 
     
Observations 61 54 54 61 
R-squared 0.124 0.003 0.001 0.022 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 4.4: World Bank Government Effectiveness and Educational attainment in 1900 
 World Bank 
Government 
Effectiveness 
World Bank 
Government 
Effectiveness 
World Bank 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
    
Educational 
attainment in 1900 
0.326*** 
(0.111) 
0.341*** 
(0.110) 
0.279** 
(0.112) 
    
Level of European 
Settlement 
0.982* 
(0.512) 
1.109** 
(0.518) 
1.394** 
(0.559) 
    
Statehood in 1500  0.00672  
  (0.00513)  
Statehood in 1850   -0.0113* 
   (0.00672) 
    
Constant -0.621*** -0.772*** -0.257 
 (0.0931) (0.148) (0.235) 
    
Observations 56 56 56 
R-squared 0.565 0.579 0.588 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.5: World Bank Government Effectiveness and Educational Attainment without Neo-
Europes 
 World Bank 
Government 
Effectiveness 
World Bank 
Government 
Effectiveness 
World Bank 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
    
Educational 
attainment level in 
1900 
0.577*** 
(0.170) 
0.644*** 
(0.172) 
0.539*** 
(0.170) 
Level of European 
settlement 
0.539 
(0.586) 
0.717 
(0.585) 
1.048 
(0.663) 
Statehood in 1500  0.00883*  
  (0.00517)  
Statehood in 1850   -0.0112 
   (0.00715) 
    
Constant -0.681*** -0.901*** -0.334 
 (0.107) (0.166) (0.245) 
    
Observations 52 52 52 
R-squared 0.326 0.365 0.359 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.6: ICRG Bureaucratic Quality and Educational Attainment Levels without Neo-Europes 
 ICRG 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
ICRG 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
ICRG 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
VARIABLES Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
    
Educational 
attainment in 1900 
0.168** 
(0.0641) 
0.204*** 
(0.0618) 
0.173** 
(0.0646) 
Level of European 
settlement 
-0.0747 
(0.215) 
0.0261 
(0.206) 
-0.164 
(0.243) 
Statehood in 1500  0.00492***  
  (0.00181)  
Statehood in 1850   0.00202 
   (0.00252) 
    
Constant 0.428*** 0.294*** 0.362*** 
 (0.0378) (0.0609) (0.0901) 
    
Observations 54 54 54 
R-squared 0.148 0.257 0.158 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.7: World Bank Tax Ratio and Educational Attainment in 1900 without Neo-Europes 
 World Bank 
Tax Ratio 
World Bank 
Tax Ratio 
World Bank 
Tax Ratio 
 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
    
Educational 
attainment in 1900 
4.867** 
(1.974) 
4.615** 
(2.135) 
3.936* 
(1.986) 
Level of European 
settlement 
-2.199 
(7.407) 
-1.425 
(7.805) 
6.454 
(8.276) 
Statehood in 1500  0.0105  
  (0.0669)  
Statehood in 1850   -0.167* 
   (0.0842) 
    
Constant 13.93*** 13.68*** 18.83*** 
 (1.271) (2.081) (2.756) 
    
Observations 36 35 35 
R-squared 0.212 0.188 0.279 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.8: State Capacity and Educational Attainment with Colony Dummy without Neo-Europes 
 World Bank 
Tax Ratio 
World Bank 
Government 
Effectiveness 
ICRG 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 
    
Educational 
attainment in 1900 
4.732** 
(2.264) 
0.600*** 
(0.168) 
0.159*** 
(0.0523) 
Level of European 
settlement 
-2.057 
(8.670) 
1.177* 
(0.617) 
0.483** 
(0.196) 
Statehood in 1500 0.00997 0.0107** 0.00545*** 
 (0.0681) (0.00513) (0.00151) 
British settlement -0.381 0.312* 0.240*** 
 (2.113) (0.162) (0.0498) 
Constant 13.87*** -1.114*** 0.135** 
 (2.373) (0.196) (0.0605) 
    
Observations 35 52 54 
R-squared 0.189 0.411 0.496 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 4.9: World Bank Government Effectiveness and Educational Attainment given Geography 
and GDP 
VARIABLES World Bank 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Model 20 
World Bank 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Model 21 
World Bank 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Model 22 
    
Educational 
Attainment in 1900 
0.283*** 
(0.0715) 
0.752*** 
(0.199) 
0.410* 
(0.217) 
    
Level of settlement 0.329 
(0.631) 
1.418** 
(0.634) 
0.305 
(0.751) 
    
State Capacity in 
1500 
 0.0117** 
(0.00512) 
0.00575 
(0.00603) 
    
State Capacity in 
1850 
-0.00743 
(0.00637) 
  
    
British settlement  0.269 0.208 
  (0.163) (0.190) 
Region (geography)  -0.0284 
(0.020) 
-0.0277 
(0.023) 
Logged GDP/capita   0.401*** 
(0.128) 
    
Constant  -0.871*** -3.642*** 
  (0.260) (0.955) 
    
Observations  52 36 
R-squared  0.435 0.495 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.10: State Capacity and Educational Attainment with Colony Dummy without Neo-
Europes 
 Educational 
attainment in 
1950 
Model 23 
  
Educational 
attainment in 
1900 
2.073*** 
(0.267) 
  
Constant 1.153*** 
 (0.194) 
  
Observations 60 
R-squared 0.511 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
Figure 4.3: Educational attainment in 1900 and 1950 
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Appendix 
 
Table 4.11: ICRG Bureaucratic Quality and Educational Attainment Levels with Neo-Europes 
 ICRG 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
ICRG 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
ICRG 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
ICRG 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
VARIABLES Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 
     
Education 
attainment in 1900 
0.109*** 
(0.04) 
0.119*** 
(0.0384) 
0.114*** 
(0.0413) 
0.0205 
(0.04_ 
    (0.0368) 
Level of European 
Settler 
0.0701 
(0.183) 
0.159 
(0.178) 
0.0224 
(0.201) 
-0.184 
(0.16) 
     
Statehood in 1500  0.00443**  0.00408*** 
  (0.00177)  (0.002) 
Statehood in 1850   0.00137  
   (0.00232)  
Education 
Attainment in 1950 
   0.105*** 
(0.02) 
     
Constant 0.439*** 0.328*** 0.393*** 0.204*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0540) (0.0853) (0.0502) 
     
Observations 58 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.354 0.421 0.358 0.617 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 4.12: World Bank Tax Ratio and Educational Attainment in 1900 with Neo-Europes 
 World Bank 
Tax Ratio 
World Bank 
Tax Ratio 
World Bank 
Tax Ratio 
World Bank 
Tax Ratio 
VARIABLES Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 
     
Education 
attainment in 1900 
0.236 
(1.42) 
0.0112 
(1.44) 
-0.644 
(1.39) 
-1.939 
(1.76) 
     
Level of European 
Settlement 
2.486 
(6.75) 
2.555 
(7.00) 
9.918 
(7.09) 
-5.655 
(8.16) 
     
Statehood in 1500  -0.0333  -0.0381 
  (0.0720)  (0.07) 
Statehood in 1850   -0.189**  
   (0.0855)  
Education 
attainment in 1950 
   2.191* 
(1.21) 
     
Constant 15.67*** 16.20*** 21.29*** 14.20*** 
 (1.229) (1.974) (2.878) (2.209) 
     
Observations 40 39 39 39 
R-squared 0.028 0.034 0.147 0.119 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 4.13: Colonial education and state capacity 
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Chapter V: THE EVOLUTION OF EDUCATION, THE 
BUREAUCRACY, AND ECONOMIC ACCESS IN 
COLONIAL INDONESIA 
 
“Colonial policy tends to follow, even at a distance, domestic policy. Liberty, social 
justice, democracy, if approved as sauce for the domestic goose, are served up a little 
later with the colonial policy…” –John Sydenham Furnivall, 2014, 7 
 
Several studies argue that colonial policies were shaped by the domestic 
sociopolitical and economic conditions of the colonial regime (Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2001; Banerjee and Iyer 2005; Easterly and Levine 2003; Englebert 2000; 
Evans and Rauch 1999; Kohli 1994; Lange 2003; Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006; 
Sacerdote and Feyrer 2009). As presently noted, this observation is often translated into 
two underlying assumptions: first, metropolitan institutional frameworks were replicated 
in colonial territories (Englebert 2000; Evans and Rauch 1999; Kohli 1994); and second, 
that process of replication occurred with relative consistency in colonial projects the 
world over. These studies, therefore, often also account for patterns of similarity and 
divergence in how these institutions endured or didn’t after independence.29  
 In previous chapters, I argued that an additional mechanism facilitating 
institutional durability from the colonial to the post-colonial period is investment by 
colonial regimes in the educational attainment of colonized populations. This chapter 
explores this mechanism in The Netherlands East Indies—modern day Indonesia—first 
under the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) and later 
under state bureaucrats assigned by the Dutch crown.  
                                                             
29 Frankema (2013), Lange (2009), Mahoney (2010), Matsuzaki (2019), and Migdal et al. (1994) provide 
some insight into how institutional transmission occurs during the colonial period. 
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The Netherlands East Indies prior to the Japanese occupation (1942-1945) 
demonstrates the importance of education for the development of a colonized population, 
and ultimately for state building. Moreover, as a case study, it illustrates the causal 
mechanism of colonial inclusivity. The overarching story told here is that beginning in 
the middle of the 19th century, the Dutch central government began an education project 
that expanded access to education from mainly native elites to the general population as 
well. The shift in Dutch policy, which contributed to the expansion of education to a 
large segment of the Javanese and Sumatran30 populations before 1942, had positive 
consequences for the development of the Weberian bureaucracy, in these central parts of 
the archipelago.  
By the latter half of the 19th century, Dutch education policy in the archipelago 
began to morph into an explicit project to graft the indigenous population into the 
colonial bureaucracy, with the skills necessary to permit colonial expansion beyond Java 
and Sumatra. Even though this movement towards a more inclusive colonial state was not 
consistent for many of the remaining years of Dutch parliament control over the 
archipelago, by independence civil society flourished as the indigenous population 
experienced greater access to quality education—in terms of being trained in the skills 
needed for Weberian bureaucrats—and greater autonomy, both at the village level and in 
the Pangreh Praja, the native bureaucratic corps. 
                                                             
30 During most of the Dutch’s control over Indonesia, there operations were centralized in Sumatra and 
Java. It was not until the early 20th century that the Dutch began to expand control to outer islands. This 
was made possible by migrating well educated indigenous bureaucrats from Sumatra and Java to these 
outer islands. Given that Java and Sumatra were the administrative centers of the Dutch East Indies, 
education expansion was also geographically concentrated there as well.  
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 The reasons for the shift in Dutch policy in the archipelago are likely due in part 
to the rise of classical liberalism in Europe, which occurred in The Netherlands in the 19th 
century (de Beus 2006; te Velde 2008). As the liberalizing parliament and Dutch 
monarchy gained greater control in The Netherlands East Indies relative to the VOC, 
major shifts in colonial policies occurred.  Thus, colonial education and economic 
policies, along with institution building vacillated in tandem with the uneven gains and 
retractions of constitutional liberalism in The Netherlands. Moreover, expansions of 
liberalization and education expansion were not evenly dispersed throughout the 
archipelago, rather they largely concentrated in Java and Sumatra. At the end of the 19th 
century, a growing economic interest in expanding to the outer islands of the archipelago, 
combined with the post-1848 popularity of constitutional liberalism that led to significant 
improvements in colonial education. These improvements facilitated the continuity of 
Weberian bureaucratic structures that, in turn, contributed to higher levels of state 
capacity in contemporary Indonesia. 
 The core argument of this chapter is graphically depicted in Figure 1 and 2 
below. 
Figure 5.1: The Effect of Colonial Investment in Education on State Capacity 
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Figure 5.2: The Process of Colonial Inclusivity Development in Indonesia 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates the effect of colonial inclusive policies, like investing in the 
education of the indigenous population, on the development of contemporary state 
capacity. Figure 2 provides a more nuanced process tracing of the influence of colonial 
investment in education on the contemporary state capacity. The Dutch parliament’s 
investment in the education of the population in The Netherlands East Indies provided the 
socialization necessary for adjusting to the Dutch parliament’s imposed new institutional 
rules governing society. I argue that this socialization emboldened civil society in The 
Netherlands East Indies and equipped the non-European population to be 
professionalized into the institutions being transmitted by the Dutch. Therefore, education 
served a dual function of socializing and professionalizing the population in a manner 
that makes the Netherlands East Indies ripe for the institutional transmission the literature 
asserts. Additionally, prior to 1942 Indonesia was positioned for the higher levels of 
contemporary state capacity comparable to Mauritius and Singapore.31  
Before moving forward, it is important to mention that the gains made for the 
Indonesian population in the decades before independence were nearly upended by the 
occupation of the Japanese military from 1942-1945. Once the Japanese arrived in the 
archipelago, they quickly worked to expel all traces of the Dutch influence on education. 
This included either sending Dutch educators back to The Netherlands or imprisoning 
                                                             
31 On a scale from -2.5 to 2.5, in 2017 Singapore’s government effectiveness value was 2.21 and Mauritius’ 
government effectiveness value was 0.90. Comparatively, Indonesia’s government effectiveness value 
was 0.04.  
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them, changing the language of instruction from Dutch to Japanese, and implementing a 
curriculum of Japanese propaganda. While this did not eliminate the effects of education 
altogether, it did make the curriculum more nationalistic, which in large doses is not 
healthy for state building. I discuss this further later in the chapter. I do recognize that the 
adverse effect of the Japanese occupation on education and the bureaucracy in The 
Netherlands East Indies seems counter-intuitive given the studies that argue that Japanese 
colonialism in South Korea had positive ramifications for their institutions and long-term 
economic development (Kohli 1994). Even still, the circumstances under which Japan 
arrived in Southeast Asia during World War II (Sagan 1988) led to strikingly different 
policies compared to Taiwan and Korea.  
Overall, this chapter provides a deeper explanation for why colonial education 
policies matter for contemporary state capacity by exploring the underlying causal 
processes of the colonial inclusivity mechanism. In contexts where educational access for 
the indigenous population was greater, due to increased investment, the confluence of 
colonial education and the transformation of the bureaucracy set the stage for healthy 
post-independence state building. Conversely, this case provides some evidence that 
absent significant gains in the colonized population’s access to quality education, even 
the strongest colonial institutions did not put former colonies in the best position to build 
lasting strong state capacity.  
I begin this assessment by exploring the preconditions of colonial education 
expansion in The Netherlands East Indies: The Dutch parliament and entrepreneurs’ 
economic interests and the spread of classical liberalism in The Netherlands government. 
I then assess the evolution of Dutch colonial education policies in The Netherlands East 
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Indies from just before the classical liberal period (pre-1850), through the transition 
period (1850-1942), and to the post-independence period. 
5.1 The Netherlands Economic Climate in the 19th and early 20th 
Century 
 
 First, a precondition for the expansion of education in the Netherlands East Indies 
is the metropoles economic interests in the late 19th century and the early part of the 20th 
century. During this period that the VOC lost control of the archipelago, and the the 
Netherlands’ parliament and monarchy took over operations in the East Indies. Prior to 
and more so after this switch in leadership, the The Dutch parliament and 
entrepreneurs’’s economic interests in the archipelago were to expand operations to 
territories outside of Java and Sumatra via military means (Locher-Scholten 1994), to 
offset costs incurred during the Napoleonic Wars. This restructuring of the Netherlands 
and Netherlands East Indies relations set the groundwork for an efficient taxation system 
that increased revenues in both locales. These early institutional structures paved the way 
for more professionalized bureaucratic structures, akin to Weberian bureaucracies 
discussed in Chapter II. Additionally, this increase in revenues in the Netherlands 
partially served as a motivation to reinvest these funds in the population of the 
Netherlands East Indies. The tipping point for a deep sense of obligation to reinvest in the 
colony was created by the emergence of liberal ideologies and reforms discussed in the 
next section. 
 At the beginning of the 19th century, the Netherlands was still being ruled by 
France under Napoleon Bonaparte. It was during France’s control over the Netherlands 
that the plan to expand the Dutch colonial project in the archipelago beyond Java was 
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first articulated. In 1806, Napoleon appointed his younger brother, Louis Napoleon, to 
rule as king of the Netherlands. Subsequently, King Louis appointed Marshal Daendels to 
restore order in Java, prevent a potential attack by the British, and launch a project to 
bring a larger portion of the archipelago under Dutch control (Thee 2013, 43). At the 
time, the treasury in Java was empty, making expanding to other territories unfeasible, 
but Marshal Daendels managed to construct a highway—by conscripting large amounts 
of peasant workers who died in droves—before Java was overtaken by the British in 
1811.  
The highway constructed during Marshal Daendels’ governorship and the 
subsequent occupation of The Netherlands East Indies by the British set the stage for a 
reformation in extraction from The Netherlands East Indies that would have ramifications 
later for the investment in colonial education.32 During the British interregnum (1806-
1815), the now infamous Thomas Raffles’ tenure in Java led to the reformation of the 
colonial administration from the corrupt and fractured VOC (Netherlands East India 
Company) operation to a more stable bureaucracy. This included the introduction of a 
land tax, which was inspired by the British land tax in Bengal and which required peasant 
cultivators in Java to pay two-fifths of their yield to the British. Even though this new 
system of extracting taxes was effective, much of the revenue was embezzled by district 
heads. Moreover, even though the British tenure in Java was brief, this tax system set a 
new precedent for extraction from the the colony, which had implications for the 
emergence of western education in The Netherlands East Indies.  
                                                             
32 There is some basis in the literature by scholars who argue that the reach of the state (Scott 1998) is 
expanded by the creation of highways. 
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This new taxation system remained, after the British relinquished control back to 
the Netherlands in 1815. Once bureaucrats from the Netherlands returned to the 
archipelago after the Napoleonic Wars, they established the General Commissioners who 
created a new land tax that was achieved through bargaining between villagers and 
government officials (Gonggrijp 1949: 76-7). Once the Dutch subdued Java at the end of 
the Java War (1825-1830) and were able to streamline their tax extraction from Java and 
Sumatra, they were able to focus on conquering other islands (Thee 2013, 44).  
The new taxation system in the archipelago put The Netherlands in a position to 
be able to recover fiscally from the Napoleonic Wars by increasing its exploitation of The 
Netherlands East Indies. By the middle of the 19th century, this shift occurred as the 
Dutch attempted to recover from not only the Napoleonic Wars, but also from the 
decrease in foreign trade with the British as a result of competition over colonial territory, 
the Belgian revolt of 1830-1, and the expenditures incurred during the Java War (1825-
1830). By the time of Belgium’s secession from The Netherlands in 1830, The 
Netherlands was near bankruptcy and The Netherlands East Indies had a debt amounting 
to 40 million guilders (van den Doel 1996: 48-50). These economic setbacks positioned 
The Netherlands for relying heavily on Java and an expansion into the outer islands in 
order to recuperate some fiscal and material resources. While this decision led to a 
greater degree of exploitation in The Netherlands East Indies, it also set the stage for 
shifts in educational policies, as the demand for skilled agricultural labor in The 
Netherlands East Indies increased with this necessity. 
The fiscal setbacks both at home and abroad began to reverse when former 
military officer Johannes van den Bosch took over as Governor General in the 
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archipelago. Under his tutelage, the East Indies colonial government began to oversee the 
cultivation process to increase their revenues. This led to the introduction of the 
cultivation system, Cultuurstelsel (CS), with the goal of sending the profits from 
cultivation directly to the Dutch treasury (Booth 1998: 138). This system required 
peasants to pay one-fifth of their total production value, either in cash or crops, to the 
Indies colonial government as a land rent tax. Moreover, the emphasis on lucrative crops 
such as indigo and sugar, stagnated the production of rice and cash crops, which reduced 
the liberties of peasant workers to cultivate crops more crucial for their own subsistence, 
and which contributed to a deeper colonial infiltration of Javanese society (Boomgard 
1989: 36). While this undermined the human capital of the indigenous population, it also 
created a considerable increase in the level of revenues for the Dutch treasury, a total of 
684 million guilders between 1832-1877 (Burger 1975: 120).33 The revenues from The 
Netherlands East Indies amounted to one-third of the Dutch economy every year by the 
late 19th century (Fasseur 1992: 149-50).  
 Even though this period is marked by material abundance in the Netherlands, as a 
result of extreme exploitation of the labor and production of the native population in the 
Netherlands East Indies, there are those who argue that the material living conditions of 
at least the Javanese improved during the CS period (Elson 1997). This view is held 
because at its height, the peasants’ revenues always exceeded the one-fifth they owed to 
the Indies government versus the two-fifths they owed under the British land tax system 
(Elson 1994: 310-311). Arguably, this increased the material wealth of the colonized 
population, even though it was unfair. This argument may be persuasive if we consider 
                                                             
33 The present equivalent of $348,360,800. 
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that this period led to the reformation of the economy in ways that improved the skills 
and abilities of peasant populations, allowing them to respond to commercial 
opportunities in the long term (Elson 1994: 317).  
5.2 The Rise of Classical Constitutional Liberalism in the Netherlands 
 
 A second precondition for the ultimate expansion of education to a larger segment 
of the native population was the rise of classical liberalism in the Netherlands. Historians 
have marked the rise of classical or constitutionalism liberalism in the Netherlands as the 
gradual shift that occurred from the middle of the 19th century to the early part of the 20th 
century (1848-1918). This shift in the Netherlands was in response to the transition of the 
world and Europe in particular, to a Westphalian system. At the height of this time of 
nation-state formation, the mission of higher education institutions was to reinforce 
nationalization, democratization, and public service. After 1500, the mission of European 
universities switched from preparing students for teaching and learned professions 
(Cobban 1992, 227-228), to becoming bastions for advancing national purposes as the 
“ideological arm of the state” (Readings 1996, 45-46; Scott 1998, 110-111) and to a 
certain extent this switch in focus extended to the former colonies of France, Spain, and 
Britain (Schwartzman 1992, 973), as well as the Netherlands as I illustrate here. 
This rise of classical liberalism in the Netherlands was solidified by the passing of 
the new constitution in 1848, the mounting influence of liberal parties, and the abolition 
of the royal patriarchy under the helm of Johan Rudolph Thorbecke (1798-1872) who 
became prime minister of the parliament (de Beus 2006). The 1848 constitution 
introduced the rule of law, made headway for societal freedoms, and assigned clear 
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responsibilities to the government and parliament. Specifically, at the core of Dutch 
liberalism was an emphasis on individual freedom with restraint (te Velde 2008), 
constitutional monarchy, balance of power between the branches of government, 
sovereignty of the Dutch state, ministerial responsibility and unity of cabinet policy, basic 
rights and liberties for all citizens, foreign policy, centralization of defense, free elections, 
private property rights, justice and police, industrial infrastructure, education, assistance 
to the poor, arts and sciences, and colonial policy (de Beus 2006, 86). 
 The scope of liberalism in the Netherlands led to the increase of social legislation 
that regulated society in a structural way (te Velde 2008, 69), which had implications for 
metropolitan education policies. During this time, the Dutch government assumed that 
there should be a clear delineation between religion and society, such that the public 
space would remain neutral (2008, 69). This also meant that bridging between the state 
and society was not the intent of Dutch liberals. Rather, political representation was 
meant to anticipate what rational voters would want, and not engage with civil society to 
intuit what they may want. Eventually, disagreements over the role of the state in society 
contributed to two factions of liberals (i.e. right and left) who saw enfranchisement quite 
differently. For right liberals, the right to vote should be a right afforded to financially 
independent individuals, thus the goal of this faction was to build a bourgeois 
community. Alternatively, left liberals assumed that the well educated should be 
enfranchised, with the goal of building a national community. Ultimately, the left liberals 
(social liberals) won control over policymaking and implementation. Conrad Theodor 
van Deventer, in particular, believed that education, along with political and social 
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emancipation of the colonized in Netherlands East Indies, should be the focus of the 
Dutch government: 
[As] the population has grown faster than its resources, its food and cattle [it is 
time for the Netherlands to give a helping hand to the natives with a new liberal 
policy of] benevolent individualism.  
(Shmutzer 1977) 
 Social liberals and national liberals shaped the policies of the last half of the 19th century 
(de Beus 2006), including education policies. Left leaning classical liberals seemed to 
equate enfranchisement and citizenship with being well educated, making education a 
means of nation building.  
In sum, the gradual shift towards more left leaning liberalism near the end of the 
19th century gave way to social policies that empowered individual citizens, social safety 
nets such as security and welfare to the poor, and the introduction of the modern human, 
social, and natural sciences to the planning and organization of public policy (de Beus 
2006, 88). This included compulsory primary education as well. These shifts trickled into 
the Dutch’s colonial policy, which was formalized for the first time during this period.  
I now turn to a discussion of the evolution of colonial education policies in The 
Netherlands East Indies, which evolved from a largely agriculturally based education 
prior to 1850, to an increasingly more liberal, western-style education thereafter. 
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Table 5.1: The Dutch Educational Framework in the Netherlands East Indies (pre-1850 to 1942)  
Time Period Educational Framework 
Pre-1850 Agricultural Education Paradigm: 
Emphasizes the development of agricultural 
expertise, to increase the ability to exploit 
resources. 
1850-1942 Liberal Education Paradigm: 
Emphasizes the development of critical 
thinking skills, and the rights and role of free-
thinking citizens. 
 
5.3 Education as an Agricultural Enterprise (pre-1850) 
 
 Prior to the shift in the Dutch ideological and economic interests noted above, 
education in the Netherlands East Indies was focused on developing agricultural prowess 
or was religiously based. These two forms of education were not conducive for 
developing the human capital critical for state building. Before the introduction of a 
liberal western education in the Indonesian archipelago, the pesantren34 was the main 
form of education for the vast majority of Muslim Indonesians, although it is unclear 
what the general literacy rate was. The Netherlands East Indies’ earliest encounter with 
western education occurred in Portuguese-controlled areas, in which the Portuguese sent 
missionaries to provide natives with a Christian education. The first school for native 
elites was erected in 1536, but this was quickly retracted when the Dutch East India 
Company (VOC) arrived on the scene, for fear that education would stifle their control 
over the population (Penders 1968).35 By 1799, the total estimated number of native 
                                                             
34 Howard Federspiel (2018) states that the pesantren stems from the 18th century when learning centers 
for the Islamic faithful were established. These schools were privately run, with students entering the 
schools for a period of time and returning home when they felt that they had learned enough. Currently, 
they provide second-level training in Islamic subjects.  
35 This fear was also mirrored by the British and French in Africa (White 1996). 
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children enrolled in school was 5000 Christian pupils and access to school was limited to 
Christian converts.  
The decision to take control over the provision of education was inspired by the 
Dutch’s need to increase productivity in the archipelago. However, the type of education 
that the Dutch were willing to offer during the Cultuurstelsel period, under the tutelage of 
Johannes van den Bosch, only opened avenues to remedial education (Van der Eng 
2004). By 1808, education became the mechanism for increasing cultivation, which 
meant maintaining the status quo—exploit and extract as much as possible. Therefore, 
during this time, the goal of education was not to mimic the shifts in educational policy 
occurring at home, nor to transmit western ideas. If the goal of the Dutch was to build a 
nation-state at that time, then the decision to implement agriculturally based education 
policies was inconsistent with this end; their motive was not to produce independent, free 
thinking citizens but subjects. Like their British and French counterparts the goal of 
education in the Netherlands East Indies prior to 1850 was to teach the skills necessary to 
increase productivity and crops for exploitation (Hutagaol 1986; Penders 1968; Van der 
Eng 2004). 
 This approach to education in The Netherlands East Indies is striking given that 
between 1500-1800 education was used as a tool for nation-building in Europe. 
Monarchs at the time used education as a means to cultivate nationalism and reinforce the 
legitimacy of their state (Scott 2006, 10). This nationalism was developed through 
education by ensuring that students were taught liberal ideals of citizenry, national 
identity, and loyalty to the crown.  
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While the Netherlands East Indies did experience small gains in educational 
access to the general native population, access to education was still limited for non-
Christian Indonesians. By 1846, 15,000 Javanese Christians were educated, up from 
5,000 in 1799, an increase of 10,000 in 50 years (Penders 1968, 14). Although this was a 
significant gain, it was still a small fraction of the total population. Moreover, the content 
of the education was restricted to subjects that were not conducive to the civil society 
building projects occurring in Europe at the time. The deficit in the percentage of the 
population receiving an education and the populations relegation to only accessing 
agricultural education became further entrenched in 1849, when a law was passed to 
prevent native Indonesians from entering European schools. This decision to exclude the 
native population from these European schools is significant, because the European 
schools provided instruction in subjects that could develop the skills needed to enter the 
civil service, as well as liberal ideals deemed necessary to become free thinking citizens 
albeit in service to the state (Scott 1998, 110-111).  
Even though this law was exclusionary, it did represent a shift in the Dutch’s 
perspective on the proper channels into the colonial bureaucracy, because the law 
emphasized the necessity of education for entering the bureaucracy even for low skill 
clerical work. Prior to this period, the bureaucracy was stocked with native elites, like the 
priyayi in Java, in addition to aristocrats and trained bureaucrats sent from the 
Netherlands. The timing of this is also important and interesting, because the decision to 
implement the exclusionary education policy was made one year after the reforms to the 
Dutch constitution (1848), which institutionalized liberalism. Again, it is here that we 
first see education articulated as the avenue for building bureaucratic competence in the 
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archipelago, even though it did not include much of the native population. As with other 
historical instances where one paradigmatic shift gives way to another, this law led to 
other revolutionary laws as the Netherlands and Netherlands East Indies entered the 
second half of the 19th century.  
5.4 The Rise of Liberal Education and Access to the Bureaucracy (1850-
1900) 
 
In the second half of the 19th century, as the Dutch parliament eased into more 
liberal forms of governance, education in the archipelago began to take a new form 
(Penders 1968, 14). This shift away from an agrarian view of education can be traced 
specifically to the Auditing Act of 1864 (Comptabiliteitswet 1864) under Fransen van de 
Putte.36 This new law finally required parliament to set aside a budget for each colony. 
The ability to explicitly allocate funds to The Netherlands East Indies had been made 
possible originally by the increase in production and fiscal intake from the colony under 
the Cultuurstelsel system. The Auditing Act demolished Cultuurstelsel and was extended 
further with the Agrarian Law (Agrarischewet) of 1870, which provided planters with 
secure land tenure while protecting the rights and interests of the indigenous population 
(Penders 1968, 19). 
The government gradually came to reali[z]e that the Javanese nobility and the 
village headers on whose effective cooperation the success of the Cultuurstelsel 
depended so much did not generally have sufficient education behind them to 
carry out their tasks efficiently. After a great deal of deliberation between The 
                                                             
36 Isaäc Dignus Fransen van de Putte was a Dutch politician and Minister of Colonial Affairs from 1863 to 
1866 (Parlement & Politiek accessed 8/11/2018). 
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Hague and Batavia, a royal decree of 30 September 1848 empowered the 
Governor-General to budget annually a sum of 25,000 guilders to establish 
training schools for Javanese officials.  
(Penders 1968, 14) 
 Increased liberalism in The Netherlands subsequently led to the extension of 
Dutch language training to upper class Indonesians, and ultimately permitted indigenous 
Indonesians to attend European primary schools regardless of class and religion in June 
of 1864. This increase in liberalism occurred just before the drastic shift that was the 
Dutch Ethical Policy, introduced by Queen Wilhemina. This policy suggested that the 
Dutch had a moral obligation to contribute to the development of the population in the 
Netherlands East Indies. It is important to mention that this shift amplified policy changes 
that took place in the decades prior to the Dutch Ethical Policy. Leading to this policy, 
the Dutch perceived that they needed to retain their skilled workforce at home, and in 
response this necessitated indigenous low-level clerical and technical labor within the 
administrative apparatus (Penders 1968, 20). Thus, the expansion of education coincided 
with van de Putte opening the civil service to the indigenous population (i.e. 20 slots 
were given to native Indonesians) through a competitive entrance exam.  
In addition to the Liberal desire to ‘civilise’ the indigenous population another 
important motive behind the decision to re-open Dutch language schools for 
Indonesians was the growing need of the colonial economy for Dutch speaking 
lower clerical and technical personnel. This demand resulted from the spread of 
Western private enterprise and the subsequent need of the colonial government to 
expand its administrative apparatus…Fransen van de Putte, in 1864 took the 
120 
 
momentous decision—which again broke completely with past policy—to open 
civil service positions to all population groups in the colony. Candidates were to 
be accepted into the civil service on the basis of competitive examination. 
(Penders 1968, 21) 
As the demands for more skilled labor increased, the Dutch began founding 
institutions of higher education, especially for medical and teacher’s training. However, 
this early provision of higher education was inefficient, with a completion rate of only 
34% in the late 19th century (Penders 1968, 24). Table I below exhibits the completion 
rate at Teachers’ Colleges towards the end of the 19th century. Even though completion 
rates increased later in the 19th century, the number of pupils declined significantly in the 
final years of the century. This could have been in response to the low quantity of 
teachers, such that the number of pupils was limited to decrease the student-teacher ratio 
and increase the percentage of graduates. Yet, Table 2 provides a window into the quality 
of educational practices in the archipelago before the turn of the 20th century. By 1900, 
even though the number of students enrolled at teachers’ colleges decreased from 249 
between 1873-1877 to 105 between 1898-1899, the completion rates jumped from just 
19.6% to 76.1%. This suggests that the quality of the education increased towards the end 
of the century. 
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Table 5.2: Teachers’ Colleges Completion Rates in late 19th Century (Penders 1968, 29) 
Year # of Pupils Completion % # of Grads 
1873-1877 249 19.6% 49 
1878-1882 655 34.8% 228 
1883-1887 590 26.4% 156 
1888-1892 393 55.5% 218 
1893-1897 364 48.4% 176 
1898-1899 105 76.1% 80 
Source: Hartgerink, H.J.H. “De Staten-Generaal en het Volksonderwijs in Nederlands-Indie Op. 
Cit., 44. 1848-1918.” 
 
5.5 The Expansion of Liberalism in the Archipelago (1900-1942) 
 
 Moving into the 20th century, the Dutch continued their trajectory towards greater 
colonial inclusivity, which was fully inaugurated with the Dutch Ethical Policy. The 
Ethical Policy expanded Dutch control over the archipelago and subsequently led to the 
extension of education to a larger swath of the indigenous population. During this time, 
segments of the population were trained in European schools both in the archipelago and 
in the Netherlands. The education provided at the beginning of the 20th century reflected 
more of the educational tendencies of the Netherlands and the rest of Europe, as school 
began to teach more humanistic subjects in addition to technical skills. This marked a 
shift to quasi-liberal education, in which the goal was to build state bureaucracies 
(Hammerstein 1996, 114-116), and this is one of the early signs of state building. This 
was the natural outcome of the colonial government’s need for more bureaucrats and not 
having enough European settlers to fill all the administrative roles. This shift became 
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important later when the curriculum taught and the stated objective of filling 
bureaucracies was in direct conflict with the fact that not all natives educated in European 
schools were guaranteed a job in the bureaucracy, nor were they afforded the idealized 
rights purported in their formal training.  
The Dutch utilized their ability to administer larger segments of the population to 
increase taxation on the indigenous population. This increased taxation occurred despite 
the fact that the well-being of the native population decreased as the population boomed 
(Penders 1968, 34). For instance, the population in Java and Madura was 4,499,250 in 
1815 and approximately 28,386,121 in 1900 (Pelzer 1945). Interestingly, the influx of the 
population was the result of more vaccinations, the provision of safety nets for famines, 
and fewer violent interactions. Also, during this time the Dutch switched to the 
protectorate and steward model of colonialism. This meant lending money to the colony 
and creating new institutions to divide efforts to manage the various aspects of 
governance, in diverse locations. Yet still, the quality of life of the indigenous population 
suffered during this period, because the resources that were sent to the colony did not 
necessarily trickle down to the indigenous population.  
 The increase in taxation of the population did, however, have a critical and 
unintended consequence for state building. As the Dutch required more and more civil 
servants and the parliament continued to liberalize, they attempted to satiate the desire of 
the indigenous population to have more autonomy as taxation increased. The indigenous 
population became disgruntled with the fact that taxes continued to increase, while their 
ability to be involved in the governing process was limited to a select few. In response, in 
1903 the Dutch passed the Decentralization Law that permitted more self-governance. 
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This policy gave municipalities and regional councils greater autonomy from the Dutch 
controlled colonial government. This attempt to co-opt native intellectuals reached a 
pinnacle with the formation of the native administration corps (Inlands Bestuur). Prior to 
this native administration corps, natives were incorporated into the existing bureaucracy 
in piecemeal to meet the administrative needs and manpower deficits in the existing 
bureaucracy. The Inlands Bestuur differed from earlier native inclusion in the 
bureaucracy, because this new cadre of native bureaucrats were better trained, were given 
more responsibilities and better salaries than their predecessors. Likewise, they enjoyed 
formal recognition as an entity within the state, unlike in times past. Dutch observers in 
the Netherlands and East Indies rightfully predicted that the creation of the Inlands 
Bestuur was suggestive of an imminent independence movement or gradual transition to 
full autonomy.   
  Unfortunately, in 1906 inclusivity in the Netherlands East Indies regressed with 
the passing of the Village Act of 1906. On its face, this policy appeared to mean more 
liberalization, since it meant that villages would be recognized as legal entities. However, 
the true goal of this policy was to increase agricultural production, in line with van 
Deventer’s philosophy of irrigation, emigration, and education (Pelzer 1945: 191). This 
meant that education would also take a step backwards in service to this end. In order to 
increase agricultural production in the periphery, the Dutch moved skilled Javanese to the 
outer islands between 1936-1940, while also increasing agriculture in Java and Sumatra 
between 1900-1940. Here, the Dutch’s policies on education seemed to be a reversion 
back to the Cultuurstelsel period, in which education was used as a tool to maintain the 
agrarian status quo. This emigration policy was also an early iteration of the 
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transmigration policies of post-independence Indonesia, which was characteristically a 
“colonization program” for the outer islands (Abdoellah 1987). 
 Even though liberal education seemed to be on the decline going into the middle 
of the 20th century, during this same period there was an increase in Indonesian 
nationalism and demands for equality. The increasing Java-centric Indonesian 
nationalism and demands for equality were aided by Dutch Governor Idenburg, who 
viewed education as a means to create an autonomous native population (Penders 1968, 
65). This redirect going into the middle of twentieth century contributed to the expansion 
of education and the strengthening of the Inlands Bestuur. By the time the Japanese 
military arrived in the archipelago, the Dutch education policy held that educational 
institutions were the “tool of westernization” and a means to build bureaucracies. In 
response to this dramatic change in education policy, there were some in the Dutch 
Parliament who were concerned that expanding access to education would make natives 
adverse to labor (1968, 74). These parliamentarians were correct in their assumption; 
however, they would not see this outcome that they dreaded until after the interruption of 
their settlement from 1942-1945.  
 5.6 Japanese Interruption: A Critical Juncture (1942-1945) 
 
 Up until the arrival of the Japanese army in the archipelago during World War II, 
the Netherlands East Indies had experienced steady gains in the state and society building 
necessary for institutional transmission. In the early 1940s, the Japanese Empire 
desperate for oil to continue their war efforts during World War II (Sagan 1988), saw an 
opportunity to take advantage of the declining Dutch economy to create a stronghold in 
125 
 
the archipelago. In order to sway the indigenous population to help them expel the Dutch 
from the archipelago, the Japanese military used their geographic commonality to garner 
support. Once they arrived in Indonesia in 1942, despite significant gains in access to 
education for a larger percentage of the colonial population during the Dutch colonial 
period, this was jeopardized when the Japanese military began an assault on the Dutch 
educational structures.  
Their assault on education began with the articulation of a new education policy 
with the following goals: 1) make education more egalitarian;37 2) systematically 
eliminate Dutch influence from the education sector; and 3) turn education institutions 
into an instrument of indoctrination (Hutagaol 1986). This translated into closing Dutch-
run institutions of higher education (Thomas 1973; Junge 1973, 5). In addition to 
disrupting instruction at institutions of higher education, in general, formal education in 
the humanities came to a halt in response to the Japanese’s new education policy. 
Moreover, changing the mode of instruction from Dutch to the Japanese language created 
significant issues, given that quick courses on Japanese language were insufficient for 
students to perform well. Along with these dramatic changes to education, the Japanese 
also changed the civil service. This included replacing the Dutch civil service with a 
Japanese equivalent (Kunkoku Gakulin), and co-opted Muslim leaders into complying 
with their occupation by permitting the founding of the Sekolah Tinggi Islam Benda 
(loosely translated as Islamic Institute of Higher Education).  
The Japanese made several concessions to select groups, their education and 
bureaucratic policies had many limitations. First, similar to the Dutch, the Japanese 
                                                             
37 The policy was articulated as egalitarian, but it was a far cry from guaranteeing equal access to quality 
education. 
126 
 
concentrated education efforts on Java. Since all Dutch instructors were imprisoned or 
interned, many schools experienced teacher and faculty shortages. This was compounded 
by an insufficient amount of library materials, because all Dutch language books were 
thrown out. Most importantly, the Japanese military served as the primary representation 
from Japan during the occupation and was not equipped to provide education nor 
maintain the levels of education that had been in place upon their arrival.  
 Once the Japanese exited the archipelago in 1945, education came to a near 
standstill as the population focused on keeping the Dutch at bay upon their return. When 
the Dutch colonial officials regained control of parts of Java, revolutionaries who were 
also a part of the intelligentsia were forced to move to remote areas, forcing school 
closures. During this time, the Dutch controlled Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, and 
Surabaya, while Indonesian educational elites moved to Yogyakarta. At the same time, 
much of the population was excluded from entering Dutch institutions of higher 
education, which comprised the majority of higher education institutions in central 
Indonesia. Thus, the limitations in space at indigenous institutions of higher education 
relegated the majority of the indigenous population to not receiving education beyond our 
high school equivalent.    
5.7 Post-Independence: Education and the Status of Weberian 
Institutions 
 
 Even though Indonesia ultimately gained its independence from the Dutch 
officially in 1949, the form that education took on the heels of the Japanese occupation 
was not the most favorable for successful state building. In fact, many of the gains made 
for greater access to quality education for a larger segment of the colonized population 
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during the Dutch colonial period did, not fully recover. The paradigmatic shift to the 
goals of the educational process presented by the Japanese put Indonesia on a very 
different path, one leading to educational policies that dampened the maintenance of 
Weberian bureaucracies in Indonesia. 
On its face, it would seem that education (and as a consequence, state building) 
flourished after independence. During the independence movement, Dutch-educated 
indigenous faculty, staff, and students contributed to the founding of several new 
institutions of higher education, including the prestigious Gadja Mada State University. 
Towards the end of 1949 when Indonesia formally was recognized as an independent 
state, classes resumed at the Sultan’s Palace in Yogyakarta, while schools for medicine, 
dentistry, agriculture, veterinary medicine, law and technology were revamped or 
founded. The number of students at these higher education institutions increased from 
500 students in 1949 to 1100 students and 70 academic staff in 1951 (Higher Education 
in Indonesia 1951, 135). Also, around this time, the Ministry of Education created a 
Political Science Academy with the expressed purpose of producing administrators 
(Thomas 1973, 63). These new institutions were modelled after the University of 
Indonesia, founded by the Dutch colonial government in Jakarta.  
One of the major challenges to post-independence education and state building 
was the transition to Bahasa Indonesia as the language of instruction. At the time, Bahasa 
Indonesia was a newly constructed language from the Malay trading language and local 
languages by the nationalist independence movement leaders under the helm of Bung 
Sukarno. The unmeasured shift from Dutch and local languages as the language of 
instruction to Bahasa Indonesia created another disruption to the provision of education. 
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This deficit was magnified by an influx of students seeking to gain an education at all 
levels, paired with the shortage in the number of academic staff. Thus, the gains from 
education expansion after independence were slow going, as the student-to-teacher ratio 
exploded at the expense of quality. This skimping in quality of education also had 
ramifications for bureaucratic institutions, as the skill level of those entering the civil 
service decreased in response. 
The most significant divergence from the path set in the latter decades of Dutch 
colonialism in the archipelago was the new sense that education was a vehicle to power, 
since power and material wealth became very much tied to state institutions. Almost all 
the recognized independence leaders were well educated, receiving their education in 
both the archipelago and the Netherlands. This contributed to an association between 
education and the ability to achieve (Thomas 1965), and introduced a 1new route to 
power since the intelligentsia were received as legitimate leaders (Soemardjan 1962).  
Second, this perception that education and entrance into state bureaucracies also 
meant access to power was aided by the loosening of conditions for entrance into higher 
education institutions, which led to an influx of indigenous students pursuing higher 
education. With the door to higher education institutions wide open, more of the 
indigenous population entered university in the hopes of landing a job in the state. 
However, the loose nature of university requirements produced an influx of degrees that 
were not always of the best caliber. Even still, right from the beginning of Indonesia’s 
statehood, the tone had been set for how one accesses power in the archipelago: obtain an 
education, albeit subpar, in order to qualify for a bureaucratic position. The disconnect 
between the aforementioned poor quality of education in tandem with a recognition that 
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education should be a qualifier for bureaucratic service would have, in some ways, 
disastrous consequences for the development of the state. 
The consequences of increasing access to education without necessarily 
increasing quality would become even more entrenched in the middle of the 20th century. 
As Indonesia entered the 1950s, higher education continued to develop during a time of 
instability, as concerns about staff shortages increased. In order to meet the demand for 
higher education, between 1950-1959 the number of state universities grew from 2 to 8; 
the number of institutions of higher education grew from 6 in 1950 to 45 in 1959. Total 
enrollment in state and private institutions grew from 6,158 in 1950/51 to 32,501 in 1956-
7 (Development of Education in Indonesia 1956, 18). At the same time, enrollment in 
academies grew to 5,850 in 1959/60 (Hayden 1967, 497), as well as enrollment and 
attendance in elementary and secondary schools (i.e. from 4,926,370 to 8,220,465 
enrolled with a 60% attendance rate) (Statistic Division, Department of Basic Education 
and Culture 1956).  
Even though the number of academic institutions in Indonesia swelled in the 
1950s, shortages in teaching staff contributed to significant deficiencies in the quality of 
instruction given teacher-to-student ratios. In total, the number of teachers at all 
institutions of education were 2,908, with approximately half of the staff being part time 
only. By 1956, in higher education there were 545 professors, 389 of which were 
Indonesian and 164 foreign born; there were 634 lecturers (i.e. 510 Indonesian and 124 
foreign born); and there were 851 student assistants (i.e. 825 Indonesians and 26 
foreigners) (Development of Education in Indonesia 1956, 17). This meant that of the 
entire population enrolled in educational institutions, both primary and secondary, there 
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were approximately 4,938 teachers, professors, lecturers, and student assistants servicing 
8,258,816 students—a ratio of 1:1,672. Again, half of these instructors at various levels 
were part time. 
As an attempt to resolve the disparity, academics institutions collaborated with the 
Ministry of Education to fly professors around to universities as adjuncts, much like 
circuit judges in the United States in the 1800s. These “flying professors” were mostly 
foreigners. Another solution was to send Indonesians overseas to study in other countries. 
There were approximately 1,556 Indonesian students studying in 15 countries in 1958-59 
(Hayden 1967, 529). The largest portion of students was studying in the United States 
(526), in the Netherlands (417), and Australia (282). The final notable solution was to 
employ recent graduates as sources of administrative and teaching staff, and the 
appointed students were predominantly from University of Indonesia and Gadja Mada 
University (Hutagaol 1986, 115). Yet still, these attempts were not sufficient to produce 
the number of skilled workers and bureaucrats necessary to fuel a state the size of the 
Indonesian archipelago. 
Adding to the issues created by lack of access to quality education, was the 
politicization of education. In the early years after independence, the linkage between 
education and politics was cemented as education became a means of indoctrinating the 
population for nation-building. This was different from the use of education as state-
society building during the colonial period, because the government embedded itself into 
the selection of education officials and the curriculum. For example, presidents and deans 
of universities were also representatives of the central government, with professors 
appointed by the Ministry of Education and the President of Indonesia (Indonesia Higher 
131 
 
Education Law of 1961, article 20, section 2-5). With this level of oversight, the course 
structure and materials were infiltrated by politics, with a large portion of education 
dominated by Pancasila (The Five Principles),38 which was implemented by Sukarno’s 
administration. 
Specifically, the Guided Democracy era (1959-1965) under President Sukarno’s 
regime led to: 1) the establishment of the Department of Higher Education and Sciences; 
and 2) the issuance of a higher education law. The Higher Education Law of December 4, 
1961 (no. 22) was highly political and shifted the control over professors, students and 
private institutions to the government, by making law have oversight on curricula and 
textbooks, especially in the social sciences. Also, a number of university presidents, 
professors, and teachers were dismissed or demoted for mostly political reasons (Feith 
1963, 370-371). This was a part of The Three Missions of Higher Education (Tri Dharma 
Perguran Tinggi), which included quota restrictions on the number of Chinese 
enrollments in institutions of higher education.  
At the end of the Guided Democracy period in 1965, there were 300 public 
institutions and the number of students increased from 109,000 in 1961 to 278,000 in 
1965 (Hutagaol 1986). Quantitatively these numbers look good, especially when we 
compare them to the enrollments in 1950 (6,158) and 1965 (278,000). However, as 
insinuated throughout this discussion of the post-independence period, this uncontrolled 
growth created serious issues for the bureaucracy. Due to the insufficient number of 
educators and administrators, the academic standards were below international levels, and 
                                                             
38  See Prawiranegara (1984:77). Pancasila is the philosophical theory and policy adopted by Indonesia 
under the Sukarno administration. It was explicitly a tool of nation building that promoted the following: 
1) belief in one God; 2) righteous and civilized humanity; 3) a unified Indonesia; 4) democracy led by 
representatives of the people; and 5) social justice for all Indonesians.  
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there was an under and over-supply in certain academic areas (1986, 158). At first glance, 
it would seem that the deep connection between the government and education would 
strengthen civil society. Yet, the reality of this framework was that it took the focus off of 
the educational process that would produce the skills necessary for a meritocratic 
Weberian bureaucracy, and placed it on building nationalism.  
This all came to a head in 1966, when academic life was disrupted by the anti-
communist campaign that ousted many faculty and students (1986, 281). During the anti-
communist campaign, the Department of Education was eliminated and the plight of 
education was put under the control of the Department of Education and Culture whose 
vision for education was to produce qualified graduates for national development 
programs. This aim continued into the 1970s, wherein education was appropriated once 
again for the political agenda of the Suharto regime, rather than to create trained 
professionals to populate the bureaucracy.  
Therefore, going into the second half of the 20th century many of the gains made 
for the desired outcome—Weberian institutions—during the colonial period were 
undermined by slippages in educational quality and the over-politicization of education. 
All this occurred despite greater access to education for a larger segment of the 
population. This meant that state building efforts were stalled going into the 21st century, 
and even though Indonesia democratized in 1999, it is still plagued by sub-par 
government effectiveness.39 
 
                                                             
39 See footnote 3. 
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5.8 Summary 
 
In sum, the transformation of colonial inclusivity in Indonesia can be traced back 
to early shifts occurring in the Netherlands during the 19th century, both economically 
and ideologically. These shifts in their economic interests and ideological leanings 
towards classical liberalism, paved the way for a change in their goals for the Indonesian 
archipelago. While the expansion of education to the indigenous population in Indonesia 
largely began as a project to increase agricultural productivity in the Netherlands East 
Indies under the Cultuurstelsel system, it gradually evolved to reflect some of the effects 
that liberalization had on education in The Netherlands.  
This investigation of the evolution of colonial educational policies in the 
Netherlands East Indies provides three primary contributions to the literatures of interest 
here. The first contribution of this chapter is an exploration of the historical determinants 
of colonial education. This contribution is important, because as the literature currently 
suggests, colonial strategy varied across the colonies irrespective of colonial origin 
(Bloom and Sachs 1998; Engerman and Sokoloff 2000; Englebert 2000; Englehart 2005; 
Greene 1988; Kupperman 1995; Landes 1998; Sachs 2001). The Dutch colonial 
government’s behavior in the Netherlands East Indies and South Africa was different 
than in any of their other colonial possessions (Rogozinski 1999). Here, I provided some 
insight into why by exploring the ideological and economic motivations of Dutch 
colonial strategy in the Netherlands East Indies. 
The second contribution of this chapter is a more nuanced explanation of how 
institutional transmission occurs through the causal mechanism of colonial inclusivity. 
134 
 
This mechanism includes not only the expansion of education in a colony, but also its 
quality. I predominantly examine Dutch policy adaptations regarding native education 
using a two-part typology of educational quality—agricultural and liberal. This typology 
is informed by the historical education literature, which provides a window into the 
transformation of education in the West and in former colonies (Golding 2018; Scott 
2006; White 1996). This typology assumes that higher qualities of education, occur in 
more liberal educational paradigms. Note that the Dutch vacillated between the 
agricultural and the liberal educational framework until the early part of the twentieth 
century, when they settled into the liberal education paradigm. 
The third contribution of this chapter demonstrates how education is used as a 
tool of colonial and post-colonial state building, because it helps develop a highly skilled 
society. As mentioned in chapter II, the cultivation of society through education aids the 
transmission of Weberian institutions to the colonized population. The role of education 
as a socializing mechanism of state building is supported by scholars like Scott (2006) 
who argued that education moved from technical training to a tool for nation building, 
although not extreme nationalism, by helping create national unity and legitimizing the 
state. This contribution is an important addition to the state building literature (Niemann 
2007; Reinhard 1996; Thies 2005; Tilly, Evans, and Rueschemeyer 1985; Young 2004), 
and suggests that scholars should account for with the importance of educational 
institutions in the outcomes of various colonial projects.   
 If the story were to end there, then we would assume that Indonesia would 
develop the state capacity necessary for effective state building and maintenance that is 
seen in former colonies like Singapore and Mauritius. However, that is not the current 
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status of state capacity in Indonesia. Returning back to the assessments of educational 
attainment and state capacity in Chapter IV, if we just examine government effectiveness 
in Indonesia in 2010 its score is subzero on a scale from [-2.5, 2.5]. I argue that the 
interruption of the Japanese military towards the end of World War II sent Indonesia 
down a different path, in which education became a tool of political leaders for building 
the nation rather than building a capable state. Under Presidents Sukarno and Suharto, 
access to education expanded quantitatively, but not in ways conducive to developing a 
segment of the population with the skills necessary to build and maintain apolitical, 
technically competent Weberian bureaucratic institutions.  
 Throughout this project, I have emphasized the importance of education and 
higher educational attainment levels within a population for effective state building. 
Here, I have explored mechanisms that may explain why greater access to education may 
not always translate into a more skilled population, or into strong state capacity.  
 Prior to 1942, Indonesia provided evidence for when colonial inclusivity was 
more or less ideal, as the population experienced greater access to quality educational and 
higher educational attainment levels towards the end of the Dutch colonial government’s 
tenure. However, it also demonstrates how different types of colonialism can lead to 
divergent outcomes, as was evident from Japanese occupation of the archipelago between 
1942-1945. Due to this difference and the failure of post-independence leaders to 
reconstitute the Dutch system, Indonesia began a new path that continues to plague the 
role of education, or the lack thereof, in its state building efforts.  
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Chapter VI: CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Findings and Contributions  
 
 This investigation of colonial legacy explores how colonial education policies as a 
tool of state building ultimately affected the effectiveness of post-colonial state building 
efforts. This shifts the conversation away from how colonial legacy matters for economic 
development to its relevance for contemporary state capacity. In the context of the 
colonial studies literature, investment in education for colonized populations serves as an 
intervening process in the relationship between European colonial settlement and state 
building. This study provides a nuanced explication of this relationship by arguing that, 
as colonial governments created greater access to both western, liberal education and 
posts within the colonial bureaucracy, the institutional transmission proposed by existing 
literature was more likely to occur. This institutional transmission was instrumental to the 
endurance of colonial institutions and the post-colonial state building that undergirds 
contemporary state capacity. 
Therefore, post-colonial state building was more effective in contexts where there 
was greater colonial inclusivity. Even when a small percentages of the population were 
empowered and equipped to engage with Weberian institutions, post-colonial leaders 
were more capable of building stronger states than colonial counterparts wherein colonial 
inclusivity did not exist or was weaker. This intervening process along with others 
previously explored in the literature expands our understanding of the variation in 
contemporary state capacity in the post-colonial world.   
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 The underlying logic of the relationship between colonial inclusivity and 
contemporary state capacity is presented in great detail in Chapter II. There I argue that 
the processes underpinning this causal mechanism—colonial inclusivity—the dynamism 
that exists between the conditions in the metropole and in the colony. First, colonial 
education policy was influenced by the rise of constitutional classical liberalism in 
Europe (i.e. the metropole) and shifting economic conditions in the metropole. Second, 
the selection of colonial education policy and how it was implemented was influenced by 
the conditions in the colonies and the metropole’s perception of the population. Colonies 
where the metropole’s interest and the push for more public services in the colony created 
ripe conditions for the investment in colonial education and granting the colonized access 
to the bureaucracy, were better positioned for the transmission of Weberian institutions 
and an overall upward trend in state building. These colonies are hypothesized to have 
better contemporary state capacity than their counterparts. 
 In the first empirical chapter, Chapter III, I explore the relationship between the 
level of European settlement and contemporary state capacity, a relationship that has thus 
far only been qualitatively assessed. This relationship functions as an important 
intervening process in the Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) study and others like 
it. I test this relationship by employing the level of European settlement measure 
commonly used in the literature as an primary explanatory variable, along with four 
indicators of state capacity—government effectiveness, bureaucratic quality, the political 
constraints index, and tax as a percentage of GDP—as the dependent variable. I find that 
the level of European settlement has a positive, and significant effect on all the indicators 
of state capacity in 2010. This provides some quantitative evidence for the first half of the 
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Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) argument (e.g. that the level of European 
settlement has an indirect effect on economic development by influencing institutional 
quality), as well as an empirical starting point for teasing out the influence of colonial 
legacy on contemporary state capacity. 
 I take this further in the second empirical chapter, chapter IV, with an assessment 
of the relationship between colonial inclusivity operationalized as colonial educational 
attainment and three indicators of contemporary state capacity in 2010—government 
effectiveness, bureaucratic quality, and tax as a percentage of GDP. I find that even when 
accounting for the classic proxy for colonial legacy—level of European settlement—and 
some of the alternative explanations in the literature, such as colonial identity (e.g. British 
or French colonialism), economic development, and pre-colonial structures, colonial 
educational attainment levels in 1900 are a good predictor of at least two of the indicators 
of state capacity (government effectiveness and bureaucratic quality). I also demonstrate 
that this finding holds when I utilize a new measure of educational attainment (Lee and 
Lee 2016).  
 In chapter V, I build upon these empirical findings with a historical assessment of 
the development of colonial inclusivity and its long-term implications for contemporary 
state capacity in the Netherlands East Indies. In the Netherlands East Indies, the rise of 
classical liberalism in the Dutch parliament, along with an economic imperative to 
expand colonial operations beyond Java and Sumatra despite a shortage of European 
settlers, led to the extension of western, liberal education to populations in Java and 
Sumatra. By the early decades of the 20th century, compared to the middle of the 19th 
century, a larger segment of the Javanese and Sumatran population had access to 
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education and even held posts within the state. The increase in the number of skilled 
laborers aided Dutch colonial authorities in extending their operations to outer islands, by 
migrating educated Javanese and Sumatrans to outposts in order to administer colonial 
state policies. The inclusion of the colonized population in the colonial state during this 
period equipped post-colonial leaders with the skills to continue state building efforts, 
even though this was disrupted by some of the shifts to the educational system under the 
Japanese occupation (1942-1945). 
 In sum, this project aims to provide a more detailed explanation of how the 
process of institutional transmission occurred during the colonial period. I find evidence 
that investments in education during colonial rule furthers state-building efforts in 
meaningful ways. Moreover, this investment and empowerment of the colonized 
population reinforced state-building efforts in  both the immediate and long term. 
Colonies where colonial education policies were implemented that led to higher levels of 
educational attainment levels enjoy higher levels of contemporary state capacity than 
their counterparts who had lower levels of educational attainment levels at the turn of the 
20th century. Moreover, even though the investment in education increased most 
dramatically in the early decades of the 20th century, the robustness tests suggest that 
selection of observations of colonial educational attainment from 1900 is a good predictor 
of colonial educational attainment levels in the middle of the 20th century. This suggests 
that the investment in education right before the World Wars is a good predictor for 
educational policy thereafter.  
 The main contribution of this project is a more detailed exploration of how 
colonialism matters for contemporary state capacity, by exploring underlying processes 
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of colonial state building and how these institutions endured after independence. It 
sharpens our understanding of the determinants of state capacity, a seminal concept in 
comparative politics and international relations. I also further our understanding of 
colonial legacies through the empirical findings of Chapter III and IV, which demonstrate 
that not only does the level of European settlement matter for state building, that colonial 
practices and interactions with the colonized population also matter more for 
understanding colonial impacts on and contemporary governance. The empirical findings 
and case study of Chapter V suggest that colonial practice had more than superficial 
ramifications for former colonies. 
6.2 Future Research  
 
Several extensions that would reinforce and deepen this examination of colonial 
education policies and their importance for contemporary state capacity. These include 
the inclusion of additional case studies and within-case analysis. Also, an exploration of 
the international externalities that influenced colonial policy, would further contextualize 
the policies employed. Furthermore, an expansion of the empirical assessments to later 
years of the colonial period and present levels of state capacity would increase the 
strength of this explanation. There is evidence from the Netherlands East Indies and 
British Malaya that suggests that the greatest expansion in education occurred between 
1910-1930. Thus, an analysis that contemplates educational attainment in 1925 and the 
most recent indicators of state capacity may provide a clearer picture of the relationship 
between colonial education policies and contemporary state capacity.  
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Previous studies of colonial legacy have made a compelling case for causal 
mechanisms and processes using a comparative historical analysis. While Chapter V’s 
examination of the development of colonial inclusivity in the Netherlands East Indies 
creates a baseline for understanding, comparing the development of colonial inclusivity 
there to British Malaya and the Philippines would provide greater leverage over 
alternative explanations and demonstrate how variance in colonial inclusivity contributes 
to variance in contemporary state capacity.   
This investigation could also be furthered by more extensive within-case analysis 
focused on subnational variation. In Indonesia, the administration of colonial education 
policies was not even across the archipelago. Since independence, Indonesia has also 
experienced varying levels of state capacity across the archipelago, with more 
effectiveness in some regions compared to others. Within-case analysis could assess 
whether colonial inclusivity can explain subnational variation in contemporary state 
capacity. This would also permit deeper explanation of patterns in educational provision 
based on gender, ethnic group, and religious background, which could contribute to 
within-case variance as well.  
Scholars like McCoy (2009) and Sagan (1988) suggest the utility of investigating 
the international dimensions of colonial education policy. Competition for colonial 
territory and conflicts between states had an impact on the colonies that European powers 
controlled, how borders between territories were created, and the economic capacity of 
European powers (Owolabi 2015; Rodney 1972). One could assume that these dynamics 
would have some effect on colonial policies. For example, the implementation of the 
Cultuurstelsel period in the Netherlands East Indies was a product of the Napoleonic 
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Wars in Europe, and the Netherlands’ subsequent attempt to recover from the economic 
devastation of that period, by increasing its exploitation of the East Indies. Future 
investigations could explore how investments in education were influenced by 
international factors.    
Finally, the study of colonial education policy could benefit from being updated 
with an empirical assessment of colonial educational attainment levels just before the 
First World War and present levels of contemporary state capacity. Even though 
investment in education for colonized populations did increase considerably towards the 
end of the 20th century. The most dramatic shifts occurred in the years just before and 
during the First World War. As a robustness check, this investigation could benefit from 
choosing different years to assess this trend. Finally, once statistics on state capacity for 
2020 are available, it would be interesting to test whether these effects persist today.  
6.3 Caveats 
 
 Before concluding this study, it is important to provide a few caveats. First, I 
anticipate pushback from post-colonial scholars who may take issue with the fact that I 
am situating this discussion squarely in the Eurocentric political economy and state 
building tradition. Also, I want to acknowledge the fact that the metrics of governance are 
rooted in western notions of “good governance”. Part of my contribution is to alter this 
existing tradition, by exploring the overlooked process of the development of the 
colonized population, assessing the variance in how European policies mattered for 
human development in the colonies. Second, much existing research implicitly assumes 
that forward movement in the colonies was at the mercy of Europe; by contrast, I want to 
143 
 
highlight the many contributions of the developing world to the developed. Even though 
Europe influenced the agency of populations in the developing world, these populations 
still have agency. 
More on the first caveat, it is important to make clear that this exploration of how 
colonial inclusivity contributes to state and societal building is not a normative claim that 
colonialism was a good thing. It is an unfortunate truism that sometimes positive 
outcomes stem from horrid circumstances. Put a different way, sometimes good things 
happen in bad ways. The goal of this study is not to make normative claims about 
whether colonialism was “good”, but rather to provide a critical and empirical test of how 
colonialism matters for contemporary issues of governance.  
  I readily admit that exploring the legacy of colonialism for state capacity is an 
exercise in exploring Eurocentric acceptable forms of government, despite the reality that 
colonialism disrupted forms of governance considered legitimate by the indigenous 
populations of colonized areas. Scholars like Fanon (1961) made note of the fact that 
colonizers rewrote precolonial history by characterizing the world prior to their arrival as 
riddled with “barbarism, degradation, and bestiality” to justify western civilization’s 
supremacy. Thus, I acknowledge that being an educated or intellectual native during 
colonial times meant acting in accordance with the belief that the proper forms of 
governance are those established by the West. At the same time, I also recognize that 
many of these intellectuals were at the forefront of anti-colonial movements. 
The second caveat pertains to the positive outcomes that come from European 
colonialism, which may seem ironic when one considers that the colonies were created by 
the metropole for the metropole (Rodney 1972). Rodney (1972) notes that development 
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in Europe occurred, intentionally, at the expense of underdevelopment in Africa. 
Additionally, most of the colonies in the Caribbean, Africa, and Latin America 
contributed to the ability of Europe to focus on innovation and capitalistic endeavors, 
without seeing much reverse benefit. Engerman and Sokoloff (2000) call attention to the 
fact that massive inequalities and reliance on slave labor in the Caribbean and Latin 
America contributed to major divergence in these two regions’ trajectories of economic 
development because of human capital inequalities. European exploitation of labor in 
these colonies stifled rather than advanced the development of human capital.  However, 
where the colonized population was economically and socially empowered via education, 
colonized populations were able to take advantage of the new institutional contexts they 
inherited and were better equipped to continue state building efforts after independence.   
This study aims to provide clarity for why colonialism has mattered in world 
politics, showing how it continues to affect postcolonial polities. Highlighting this area of 
colonial policy can positively inform our present policymaking, as we think about the 
present and future needs and claims of countries still grappling with the effects of their 
colonial legacy. 
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